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Using Federal Environmental Regulations To
Bargain for Private Land Use Control
By William F. Pedersent
Our federal government currently pursues environmental protection
largely through regulations that require others to comply with detailed
standards or prescribed patterns of conduct. This approach conflicts too
fundamentally with the autonomy interests of landowners, and of the state
and local governments that regulate land use already, to allow federally-
imposed limits on private land use. Yet environmental improvement will
increasingly require land use limits. To achieve them, regulation should be
replaced with "bargaining entitlements "--assets of limited value that the
federal government could use to negotiate with other parties for necessary
restrictions. Indeed, agencies are already converting their regulatory
powers into such entitlements. By using bargaining entitlements, the
federal government would act more as an equal participant in negotiations
than as a unilateral issuer of "top down" commands. That change in
approach could reconcile the conflicting interests of landowners, state and
local governments, and environmentalists more effectively than regulation.
It could provide more effective environmental protection; it could improve
both respect for property rights and the constitutional defensibility of
federal land-use control efforts; and it could encourage the development of
regional land-use plans, which will be needed to reconcile environmental
protection with other social interests.
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Introduction
Thirty years of federal environmental regulation in this country have
resulted in substantial reductions in all forms of industrial pollution. As
industrial pollution declines, pollution from land use automatically ascends
in relative importance. Run-off from developed land already accounts for
more than half of the United States' water pollution. And as overall
pollution levels recede, preserving wildlife habitat will rise in the
environmental priority scale. Private land use controls will be necessary to
address these increasingly important issues.'
Our current environmental laws either do not address private land use
or address it in general and unfocused terms. Although the Clean Water
Act2 promises to clean up the nation's waters, its command is ultimately
symbolic, since the statute fails to grant the federal government the land-
use control power it would need to achieve this end. Our habitat
preservation statutes-the "Section 404" provisions for preserving
wetlands 3 and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") 4---do impose real
1 This Article does not address environmental controls on federally owned land. The plenary
constitutional power of the federal government to impose such controls, however, is universally
conceded. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 147-48 (1985) (arguing that the Supreme Court correctly held that the cancellation of grazing
rights on federal land did not require takings compensation). Nonetheless, even full exercise of the
federal government's plenary legal power over public land could not assure environmental protection.
Although the federal government owns about thirty percent of the national land area, its holdings are
concentrated in Alaska and eleven Western States (California, Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Idaho,
Montana, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico). The federal government owns only
four percent of the land in the country outside those twelve states. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATISTICS 5 tbl.3 (1993). More than half of the species
protected by the Endangered Species Act have at least eighty-one percent of their habitat on private
land. See DAVID S. WILCOVE ET AL., REBUILDING THE ARK: TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT FOR PRIVATE LAND 3 (1996), quoted in Hope M. Babcock, Should Lucas
v. South Carolina Council Protect Where the Wild Things Are?, 85 IOWA L. REV. 849, 858 n.30
(2000). Accordingly, to the extent environmental protection requires land use controls at all, controls
on private as well as public land would be needed.
2 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 ("Clean Water Act"), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
3 Clean Water Act § 404.
4 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2002).
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land-use constraints. They do so, however, by applying an inchoate
procedural burden to all areas under their authority, without selecting any
specific lands for actual preservation. That approach is both ineffective
and inefficient, since it can neither guarantee protection for the most
sensitive places, nor avoid placing regulatory burdens on parcels less vital
to wildlife preservation.
These statutes embody the command-and-control regulatory approach
traditionally used for environmental protection. Congress prescribes in
detail both the goals to be achieved and, often, the means to achieve them,
while administrative agencies supply any missing means by issuing and
enforcing rules that tell the regulated entities how to comply. Although
command and control has been heavily criticized for its failure to
accommodate the interests and capabilities of those it regulates, it has
controlled industrial pollution reasonably well. In contrast, federal
command and control has proved almost totally unable to address the
environmental problems caused by private land use. That failing, in turn,
has led to an artificial neglect of these problems. 5
This Article contends that such problems of governance could be
overcome, and environmentally protective land-use control could be
promoted, by replacing our current top-down procedures of law creation
with the bargaining entitlements approach used in the private world. Our
legal system does not typically accommodate the conflicting preferences
of its private participants by requiring one of them to issue commands to
others in the manner of a regulatory agency. Instead, it equips each
participant with entitlements of value to others, and then allows them to
bargain from that prescribed starting point toward mutually satisfactory
agreements.
Allowing regulatory agencies to trade obligations imposed under the
Clean Water Act, Section 404, or the ESA for alternative measures offered
by the regulated entities would allow regulators, the regulated, and
regulatory beneficiaries to negotiate the exchange of ineffective or
unacceptable regulatory demands for land-use plans that restricted
development of some areas and allowed development of others. In that
manner, federal land-use commands designed to be imposed from the
outside on states and private persons would be converted into bargaining
assets and traded for agreements under state property and land-use
planning laws.
This new approach would improve both environmental protection and
public acceptance of environmental controls, could reform environmental
5 William Ruckelshaus has compared the tendency of our environmental protection system
to focus on problems that regulation can address, such as pollution from major industrial sources, to a
drunk who has lost his keys in a dark alley and searches for them under a lamppost because the light is
better there. William D. Ruckelshaus, Stopping the Pendulum, ENvTL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1995, at 27.
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statutes by clarifying the relationship between their asserted goals and the
means authorized to pursue them, and could improve the constitutional
defensibility of federal efforts to protect the environment.
If bargaining entitlements possess these advantages, we should
already be seeing efforts to employ them. In fact, the Clean Water Act,
Section 404, and the ESA are all now evolving toward a bargaining
entitlements approach. Increasingly, controls on industrial point sources of
water pollution can be traded for controls on non-point pollution from land
use. Similarly, the obligation not to fill wetlands without a permit can
increasingly be satisfied by creating or preserving other wetlands
elsewhere, while the obligation not to take endangered species can be met
by providing alternative benefits to the species in a habitat conservation
plan (HCP). In each case, the original regulatory obligation becomes a
stimulus for alternative performance, rather than being fulfilled as written.
Greater use of bargaining entitlements might raise concerns that
agencies structured to construct and issue commands to others in the
classic administrative manner would prove incompetent to negotiate as
equals for good value in entitlement trades. Conversely, a bargaining
approach might lead an agency to assert its regulatory claims more
vigorously than before, since the ability to trade that claim for some new
relief would have increased the value to the agency of asserting it. Even a
legally vulnerable claim could have trading value, since trading out of the
obligation might be more advantageous to the regulated party than
litigating a challenge to final adjudication. These dangers, however, would
be reduced by the greater transparency and wider range of actors that a
scaled-up compliance approach would bring to the regulatory process.
They would naturally diminish further as trading became more
widespread, and could be reduced still more by readily available reforms.
To illustrate these points, this Article first describes the differences
between our current regulatory system and a bargaining entitlements
approach and outlines how entitlement bargaining would work in practice.
The Article then turns to land use in particular. It explains why some
types of environmental protection require regional land-use control. Next,
it details how our current regulatory system either fails to address land use
or addresses it by imposing ad hoc burdens without considering any
overall plan. The Article describes how the inherent problems of land-use
control interact with the weaknesses of our national regulatory system to
make federal land-use control by traditional regulatory methods
impossible.
The Article then analyzes in systematic detail both the advantages and
potential disadvantages of bargaining entitlements. It concludes by
exploring the possible future use of bargaining entitlements beyond the
fields in which it has currently developed.
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I. Traditional Regulation and Bargaining Entitlements
A. The Nature of Traditional Regulation
The environmental protection "revolution" of the last thirty years has
relied largely on regulations at the federal level, issued under statutes that
direct businesses to apply the "best technology" to diminish air and water
releases from factories, 6 to detoxify or immobilize hazardous waste, 7 to
produce less polluting automobiles,8 to reformulate gasoline,9 to restore
land after surface coal mining, 10 and to stop producing environmentally
damaging pesticides and other chemicals."
The responsible administrative agency generally will possess the
exclusive power to determine regulatory details, subject only to judicial
review to determine whether the resulting rules were "arbitrary or
capricious."' 2 Though the law requires an opportunity for public comment
on the agency's proposals, the agency has no legal obligation to give
special weight to the comments of those most affected. If the agency
ignores any comment, and can find a moderately plausible reason for
doing so, the courts will usually sustain the agency's decision.'
3
Regulations often must be extremely detailed. Yet an agency's
limited information-processing capacity restricts its ability to issue rules
that reflect individual firms' costs and capabilities, while its power to
command results reduces its incentive to account for individual
circumstances. The resulting coarse-cut, relatively inflexible, and top-
down specification of the means of compliance has been criticized as
economically inefficient because it ignores differences in control costs
among sources and provides limited incentives for sources to apply their
unique knowledge to devise more potent forms of pollution control.'
4
6 See Clean Water Act §§ 301, 304; Clean Air Act §§ 111-12, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-12
(2000).
7 See Solid Waste Disposal Act § 3004,42 U.S.C. § 6924 (2000).
8 See Clean Air Act § 202.
9 See Clean Air Act § 211.
10 See Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 515, 30 U.S.C. § 1265
(2000).
11 See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act of 1947 § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)
(2003); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2000).
12 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); see also 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000); Portland Cement Ass'n v.
Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13 The D.C. Circuit has stated:
The substantial-evidence standard [for judicial review of agency rules] has never
been taken to mean that an agency rulemaking is a democratic process by which
the majority of commenters prevail by sheer weight of numbers .... The number
and length of comments, without more, is not germane to a court's substantial-
evidence inquiry.
Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 122 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
14 Government is rarely in a good position to know what sorts of innovations
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Traditional regulation also shortchanges the broader, non-economic
autonomy interests of regulated entities by imposing compliance
obligations that are more confining than is needed to achieve the statutory
ends.' 5 Finally, reliance on detailed statutes that give rise to equally
detailed regulations leads to confusion between (or a conflation of) ends
and means, which in turn hinders reform efforts and prevents realistic
assessment of statutory success or failure.'
6
B. Bargaining Entitlements as an Alternative
1. The Nature of Bargaining Entitlements
The top-down approach of federal regulation departs markedly from
the way in which non-governmental entities in our society adjust their
relationships. Private persons generally are not required to command each
other to observe the rules of some new social arrangement. Instead, the
legal system equips them with entitlements of varying strength to influence
the actions of others and then relies largely on private bargaining to
generate any subsequent changes.
17
Privately-held entitlements are almost always alienable, in part to
allow bargaining.' 8 The holder usually can give away his power to enforce
the originally specified entitlement terms, or trade it for some alternative,
are likely to be forthcoming; industry will have a huge comparative advantage
here. Perversely, requiring adoption of the BAT [best available technology]
eliminates the incentive to innovate at all, and indeed creates disincentives for
innovation by imposing an economic punishment on innovators. Under the BAT
approach, polluting industries have no financial interest in the development of
better pollution control technology that imposes higher production costs.
CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 281-82 (1997).
15 See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risk Through Economic Incentives,
13 CoLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 153, 154 (1988) ("Our current environmental regulatory system ... unduly
limits private initiative and choice. The centralized command system is simply unacceptable as a long-
term environmental protection strategy for a large and diverse nation committed to the market and
decentralized ordering.").
16 This argument originated with Professors Ackerman and Stewart, who argued that our
current best technology system "conflates means and ends, preventing the intelligent assessment of
either." Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV.
1333, 1340 (1985).
17 Calabresi and Melamed frame the issue as follows:
The state not only has to decide whom to entitle, but it must also
simultaneously make a series of equally difficult second order decisions. These
decisions go to the manner in which entitlements are protected and to whether an
individual is allowed to sell or trade the entitlement .... [These] latter
decisions ... shape the subsequent relationship between the winner and the loser.
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View
of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089-90, 1092 (1972).
18 In the private sphere, inalienable entitlements that the holder must assert in their original
form are largely restricted to bars on alienating fundamental personal rights, such as the prohibition
against selling oneself into slavery, designed to protect a "nonmarket" sphere of human activity. See
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
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preferable performance. A landowner, can grant a neighbor the right to
walk across her property in return for the right to walk across the
neighbor's property. In contrast, regulatory agencies generally hold their
enforcement powers as inalienable entitlements, which they must enforce
in accordance with their original terms.1 9 This may be the most
fundamental distinction between government and privately-held
entitlements.
Academic analysis has focused on categorizing the types of
entitlements held by independent and autonomous decision makers.
Academic analysis distinguishes sharply between entitlements that confer
full power to decide the entitlement disposition and entitlements that can
be overridden by the actions of others. If the entitlement is a property
right, its holder has an unconditional claim to direct others to act in
accordance with the entitlement's terms. For example, a landowner
generally has an absolute right to evict trespassers and to refuse their offer
to purchase a right of passage. If the entitlement is a liability right, others
can be free of it by paying a fixed sum, regardless of the entitlement
holder's preferences. For example, a polluter may be allowed to purchase
the right to pollute by paying damages, despite the entitlement holder's
objections.2"
These distinctions do not fit government actors well. Even if
regulatory entitlements were made alienable, they would still be hard to
classify as either property rights or liability rights. The non-delegation
doctrine requires all agency regulatory actions to conform to legislatively
established standards that confine agency freedom of decision in the
interest of public accountability. 2' Accordingly, that doctrine forbids
government agencies from possessing the unconfined power to say yes or
no to an exchange offer, which is the essence of a property entitlement.
Conversely, the very purpose of a bargaining entitlements approach is to
involve the agency in particularizing alternative performance requirements
through negotiations. It would be self-defeating, even if it were possible, to
turn the trading program into a liability obligation by defining in advance,
so as to exclude agency discretion, the types of private offers that the
agency would be compelled to accept. Instead, the guiding legislation
would establish neither an absolute right to reject private offers nor an
absolute duty to accept them, but rather would set general standards for the
agency to particularize in individual decisions. Such an entitlement would
display elements of both property and liability rights without clearly being
19 See Carol M. Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2192 (1997) ("In
the [standard Calabresi and Melamed matrix of entitlements] classification, command-and-control
rules seem to fit most easily as 'inalienability' rules.").
20 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
21 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472-76 (2001).
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one or the other.
Once made alienable, government entitlements will always collapse
to a midpoint reflecting both property and liability elements. The
fundamental distinction among types of entitlements held by the
government therefore lies not so much between property and liability rules
as between alienable and inalienable claims.
2. Entitlement Bargaining in Practice
Traditional regulation gives a regulatory agency both the right and the
duty to command socially desired results directly. Entitlement bargaining,
in contrast, allows the government to accept some newer and better
performance that it could not command directly. It is designed to
encourage the regulated entity to make such offers.
Under this approach, a factory would not necessarily reduce its own
discharges to comply with water pollution laws. Instead, it might pay
others to reduce run-off from land development. Similarly, a developer
seeking to develop a wetland would not necessarily have to convince the
government that statutory standards allowed that wetland's destruction.
Instead, it could get a permit by creating or preserving wetlands elsewhere.
The ability to make such offers would grant more freedom to the
regulated entity and- require more creativity than lobbying an agency
through public comment on a proposed regulation. In particular, it would
motivate the formation of coalitions of regulated entities and state and
local government agencies to allow the design of more attractive land use
planning offers.
Such offers would invite bargaining between offerors and an agency,
particularly since the standards for accepting or rejecting offers would be
broader than the standards for issuing a regulation, thus conferring more
discretion on the agency. These negotiations could serve as both a political
forum and a marketplace. They would allow the participants to attempt to
convince each other of the benefits of their favored land use approach,
perhaps narrowing the gaps between opposing positions and making final
agreement easier. To the extent that gaps still remained, creation of a
negotiating framework would make it easier to contribute other, non-
regulatory resources-for example, public land and money-toward
bridging outstanding differences.
A successful negotiated outcome would not reflect the judgment of
any one party, though all would have to find it acceptable. Instead, it
would reflect the relative strength of the bargaining entitlements with
which each side began, the attractiveness of the offer, the relative skill of
the parties, and the merits of the 'Case. The importance of these factors
would shift over time, as repeat players like the government learned how
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to bargain better, and could change further through legislative action. For
example, Congress could equip an agency with additional entitlements,
such as the ability to grant or withhold certain funds, in order to increase
that agency's bargaining power.
Several of the quality-control procedures applied to traditional
regulation, such as public notice of proposed bargains, the right to
comment on bargains, and limited judicial review, could also apply to
entitlement bargaining. However, the incentives for and institutional
demands on each participant would fundamentally differ between
bargaining and regulation and could lead to different results.
Regulatory programs without land use implications could certainly
use bargaining entitlements.22 This Article focuses solely on land use
because bargaining entitlements hold special promise for synthesizing the
sharply conflicting interests that characterize land use control into better
and more generally acceptable solutions than top-down regulation has
produced.
II. The Environmental Case for Land Use Control
A. Water Quality Improvement and Land Use Control
In environmental discussions, "water pollution" is often shorthand not
just for the amount of foreign matter that a water body contains, but also
for the impairment of its ability to perform such other "green" functions as
supporting wildlife or providing water-based recreation. That ability is
affected by flow patterns and temperature, as well as by foreign matter.23
Land use is now the leading cause of water pollution in this country
under either definition. At least half of the foreign matter in water does not
come from factories or sewage treatment plants but instead from the
physical alteration of land in the course of its economic development.24 In
urban and suburban areas, that pollution is due largely to increases in
impervious surfaces such as roads, rooftops, and parking lots. Rain runs
off those areas quickly rather than percolating into the ground as it would
in areas that retained their natural vegetation. That mun-off carries with it
22 For a further discussion, see William "F. Pedersen, Contracting with the Regulated for
Better Regulations, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 1067 (2001).
23 The Clean Water Act itself reflects this distinction between the two definitions of
"pollution." The statute defines "pollutant" as a physical material (or heat), and regulates any discharge
of such "pollutants" from a "point source" into water. 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(a), 1362(6)-(16) (2000). It
defines "pollution" far more broadly as "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical,
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water," 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) (2000), and regulates it
far less comprehensively.
24 According to the EPA's 1998 Water Quality Inventory, the top three sources of pollution
to rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, and reservoirs arise from land use changes. EPA, 1998 WATER
QUALITY INVENTORY 62, 88 (2000).
Vol. 21:1, 2004
Bargaining for Land Use Control
contaminants like oil, brake dust, and precipitated air pollutants that urban
life has deposited on impervious surfaces. When these more rapid and
concentrated flows run over bare land, they scour up the soil and carry it
into the water.25 Water pollution in an area therefore tends to increase in
direct proportion to the increase in impervious surfaces.
2 6
In rural areas, removing the original vegetation can lead to massive
erosion. Water flows more rapidly off plowed fields or logged areas than
unaltered terrain and takes soil with it. In addition, the intensive use of
fertilizer and pesticides contaminates the resulting run-off. Soil, fertilizer,
and pesticides run-off from farms has become the largest single source of
27water pollution in the country.
In both urban and rural areas, accelerated run-off also leads to
physical changes in flow patterns. In areas that retain their natural cover,
the groundwater absorbs most rainfall before it reaches a stream. When
that natural cover is removed, rain reaches the stream far more directly,
leading to higher peak flows and lower minimum flows. The higher peak
flows scour the streambed and change its shape, decreasing its ability to
support life.28 Logically, the increased rapid flows should also reduce the
rate at which rainfall recharges depleted groundwater levels. 29 They also
increase the probability and extent of flooding. Both the addition of
25 See Thomas R. Schueler, The Importance of Imperviousness, in THE PRACTICE OF
WATERSHED PROTECTION 7, 8 (Thomas R. Schueler & Heather K. Holland eds., 2000); see also Basic
Concepts in Watershed Planning, in THE PRACTICE OF WATERSHED PROTECTION, supra, at 145, 150
fig.7, 152 fig.9 (graphing the quantitative relationship between amount of impervious cover and
phosphorous and nitrogen pollution loads). This relationship holds true for lakes, ponds, and estuaries,
as well as streams. See id. at 151-52 ("Research points to the strong influence of impervious cover on
coastal/estuarine systems such as shellfish beds and wetlands. Interestingly, each study [of the three
cited] found degradation thresholds when impervious cover exceeded 10%."(citations omitted)).
26 Schueler, supra note 25, at 8; see also id. at 7 ("[T]he total run-off volume for a one-acre
parking lot.., is about 16 times that produced by an undeveloped meadow.").
27 According to the EPA's 1998 Water Quality Inventory, agriculture is the leading cause of
water quality impairment in streams and rivers. It is three times as important as the next most
important factor and affected twenty percent of the total stream miles surveyed. 1998 WATER QUALITY
INVENTORY, supra note 24, at 62. Agriculture is also the leading cause of water quality impairment in
lakes. It is twice as important as the next most important cause and affects fourteen percent of the total
lake areas surveyed. Id. at 88. In both cases, hydrological modification was the second most important
cause of impairment; and urban run-off, the third. Only in estuaries were water quality problems due
primarily to non-agricultural factors-specifically, municipal treatment plants and urban run-off. Id. at
108.
28 Schueler, supra note 25, at 8. For a discussion of similar effects from agriculture,
particularly uncontrolled cattle grazing, see OFFICE OF WATER, EPA, NATIONAL MANAGEMENT
MEASURES TO CONTROL NON-POINT SOURCE POLLUTION FROM AGRICULTURE 2-24 to 2-27, 4-140 to
4-141 (2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/agmm/agmm.zip [hereinafter NATIONAL
MANAGEMENT MEASURES].
29 See Schueler, supra note 25, at 8 ("Because infiltration is reduced in impervious areas,
one would expect groundwater recharge to be proportionately reduced.... Actual data, however, that
demonstrate this effect is rare."); see also Dry Weather Flows in Urban Streams, in THE PRACTICE OF
WATERSHED PROTECTION, supra note 25, at 50 (stating that "a cause-and-effect relationship has yet to
be directly observed" between increases in impervious cover and decreases in dry weather flows in
streams, and giving reasons for the relative absence of data).
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impervious surface and the removal of trees lead to increases in stream
temperature.3 ° Such non-point water pollution causes major environmental
damage off the mouth of the Mississippi and in interstate estuaries like the
Chesapeake Bay.3 '
Comprehensive restrictions on land use might be needed to reduce
non-point source pollution in a watershed or to prevent its increase. While
technological treatment of effluents from factories or sewage treatment
plants can reduce pollutants by over ninety percent, urban or farm run-off
is much harder to control by such "end-of-the-pipe" methods. Capturing
such run-off in a ditch or pipe can be impracticably expensive. If the run-
off could be captured, it would often be too high-volume for effective use
of treatment technology.
Relatively local changes in planning and construction methods can
partly control run-off from new development,32 despite the lack of
technological treatment methods. Such changes generally, however, reduce
only moderately the pollution associated with a given amount of
impervious surface.33 The use of ponds, buffer zones, or reformed farming
methods to reduce agricultural run-off also seems to produce only
moderate reductions.34  Accordingly, many studies indicate that a
30 See Schueler, supra note 25, at 9 ("Impervious surfaces both absorb and reflect heat.
During the summer months, impervious areas can have local air and ground temperatures that are 10 to
12 degrees warmer than the fields and forest that they replace .... Water temperature in headwater
streams is strongly influenced by local air temperatures."). Similarly, the loss of stream-side trees leads
to water temperature increases in both urban and rural areas. See NATIONAL MANAGEMENT
MEASURES, supra note 28, at 2-24 to 2-27 (noting that the removal of vegetation can alter water
temperatures and increase fluctuations in water temperature).
31 Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs IV: The Final Frontier, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,469, 10,469-70
(1999) ("In recent decades, in almost direct correlation with the application of commercial fertilizers
upstream, the Gulf [of Mexico] has slowly but massively begun to die." (citations omitted)); see also
EPA, FINAL WATER QUALITY TRADING POLICY 1 (Jan. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html ("Nutrient and sediment loading from
agriculture and storm water are significant contributors to water quality problems such as hypoxia in
the Gulf of Mexico and decreased fish populations in Chesapeake Bay.").
32 These include the installation in the landscape of small artificial basins or ponds that
capture and hold the run-off until it percolates into groundwater, preserving buffer zones of
undisturbed forest or wetland along the edges of water bodies to soak up the run-off (and its pollution)
before it reaches the waterway, or limiting the amount of impervious surface growth associated with
any particular degree of development-for example, by requiring "clustered" housing development
that reduces the need for connecting roads. See THE PRACTICE OF WATERSHED PROTECTION, supra
note 25, at 225-305.
33 A detailed survey of all existing studies of physical control of urban run-off found limited
ability to remove such important pollutants as phosphorus (30-60% median removal performance),
nitrogen (15-35%), oxygen-demanding material (20-40%), metals (50-80%), and bacteria (55-75%
based on incomplete data, with 95% or better removal generally needed to meet water quality
standards). Removal of suspended sediment, often dirt in run-off, was somewhat better at 60-85%, but
still far from adequate to offset the effects of impervious surface growth. CTR. FOR WATERSHED PROT.,
NATIONAL POLLUTANT REMOVAL PERFORMANCE DATABASE FOR STORMWATER TREATMENT
PRACTICES 25-26 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter NATIONAL POLLUTANT REMOVAL].
34 The EPA has summarized the somewhat fragmentary data. See NATIONAL MANAGEMENT
MEASURES, supra note 28. Representative surveys found that reductions in fertilizer application of 39-
67% (the maximum recommended) led to corresponding reductions of 8-32% in nitrogen in surface
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watershed with more than ten to fifteen percent impervious surface cover,
or extensiye agricultural development, will see water quality and aquatic
biodiversity deteriorate despite the use of run-off and buffer zone
controls.35
B. Wildlife Protection and Land Use Control
Animals and plants cannot survive without their natural habitat.36 In
some cases, preserving that habitat may be consistent with a range of other
uses of the land-as when rabbits live in suburban back yards. Elsewhere,
however, preservation of the necessary habitat may rule out other uses.
Studies in conservation biology suggest that, although many species are
tolerant of human presence, the preservation of the full range of species
that existed before modem industrial civilization depends on the
preservation of large tracts of land in an undeveloped form.37
water. Id. at 4-62. Different studies found that individual best management practices ("BMPs") could
reduce pesticide flow into water anywhere from an average of 21% to an average of 92%, depending
on the study, id. at 4-81; that different combinations of BMPs could reduce sediment losses from fields
by 35-85%, nitrogen loss by 10-70%, and phosphorus loss by 30-75%, id. at 4-103; and that managed
grazing could reduce fecal coliform levels in surface water by 40%, levels that are still twice as high as
those for ungrazed land, id. at 4-148.
Of course, one might apply more than one of these BMPs to the same land. However, the
effectiveness of such a combination can be expected to be less than a simple mathematical
combination of the effectiveness of the separate approaches would predict. See id. at 5-213. Similarly,
the Soil and Water Conservation Society found that if buffers to absorb pollution were installed on all
the stream-side cropland for which they are appropriate, "[t]he actual sediment reduction on the treated
acres could approach 60 percent"-a low number by industrial pollution control standards. SOIL &
WATER CONSERVATION Soc'y, REALIZING THE PROMISE OF CONSERVATION BUFFER TECHNOLOGY
12 (2001).
35 These studies are summarized in Schueler, supra note 25, at 12 tbl.2.
36 See NAT'L CTR. FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS, AM. INST. OF BIOLOGICAL
SCIS., USING SCIENCE IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 20 fig.2 (2000) [hereinafter USING
SCIENCE] (showing that habitat loss poses a major threat to eighty percent of the endangered species
covered by habitat conservation plans, over twice as large as the next biggest threats, habitat
degradation and habitat fragmentation).
37 Almost invariably, for any given habitat type, the larger the area of land examined, the
larger the number of species that will be found there. Edward Connor & Earl McCoy, Species Area
Relationships, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIODIVERSITY 397 (Simon Levin ed., 2001). Smaller areas
support smaller overall populations, which are more vulnerable to reduction below sustainable levels
by random fluctuations in size. Some animals-in particular, large predators-require large ranges of
undeveloped land for hunting or foraging. Others, like many forest birds, depend on the inability of
many predators to penetrate the forest and will suffer if the forest is fragmented so as to provide
predator access. Still other species have specialized habitat needs such as a specialized diet, either
throughout their life or at particular times in their life cycle. For such species, simply preserving
enough of that specialized habitat to serve in normal times may be insufficient since it leaves the
species with no alternatives if that restricted portion becomes unsuitable due to weather, fire, or other
factors. The special habitat must be preserved in enough different places to provide reasonable
assurance that some of it will be available at all times. If a species vanishes for any of these reasons,
other species that depend on it will vanish too. Interview with Craig Pease, Professor of Science and
Law, Vermont Law School (Oct. 16, 2002). For a general discussion with examples, see E.O. WILSON,
THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE 220-49 (1992).
Yet even the "large area" rule is not uniform-for example, preservation of wetland dependent
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C. Types of Land and Their Environmental Characteristics
In modem industrial America, many watersheds already exceed ten to
fifteen percent impervious cover, and others will inevitably exceed it.
Many wildlife habitats have been developed, while others will be
developed in the future. The achievement or preservation of areas of high
water quality or abundant wildlife may therefore depend on leaving some
of the remaining pristine areas relatively undeveloped.38
The environmental benefits of preservation will be highly sensitive to
which areas are preserved. For water, the absorptive capacity of
undeveloped land will vary with its location and with the type of soil and
vegetation. 39 Similarly, land's value for wildlife habitat will vary with its
nature-for example, wetlands often support a uniquely wide range of
species40 -or with the rarity of the species that live there, as when old
growth forest supports the spotted owl. Undeveloped land can provide
additional environmental and social benefits beyond pollution control and
wildlife habitat, such as flood protection, groundwater recharge, and
recreational space. Those benefits for any given acreage will also vary
species may be better served by preserving many small wetlands than a few large ones. The National
Academy of Sciences has stated that "small isolated wetlands play a crucial role in the biodiversity of
other wetland-dependent fauna, such as amphibians," and are more effective per unit of size than large
wetlands in removing pollutants. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCIS., COMPENSATING
FOR WETLANDS LOSSES UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 36-37 (2002) [hereinafter COMPENSATING
FOR WETLANDS LOSSES].
38 Paradoxically, the best way to minimize the creation of additional
impervious area at the regional scale is to concentrate it into high density clusters
or centers. The corresponding impervious cover in these clusters is expected to be
very high (25% to 100%), making it virtually impossible to maintain
predevelopment stream quality. A watershed manager must then confront the fact
that to save one stream's quality it may be necessary to degrade another.
Schueler, supra note 25, at 14.
39 Although not all wetlands provide all functions, wetland functions can
include water-quality improvement; water retention, which helps to ameliorate
flood peaks and desynchronizes high flows in streams and rivers; groundwater
recharge; shoreline stabilization; and provision of a unique environment, part
aquatic and part terrestrial, that supports a diversity of plants and animals,
including a majority of the nation's rare and endangered species.
COMPENSATING FOR WETLANDS LOSSES, supra note 37, at 12. These functions will each be performed
by different wetlands to different degrees, according to their nature and location. The National
Research Council identifies failure to account for location as one of the leading causes of failure of
efforts to replace lost wetlands. See id. at 6.
40 It has been estimated that two-thirds of commercially important fishes
require estuaries or salt marshes as nurseries or spawning grounds .... Wetland
species comprise a disproportionately large number of endangered species. As of
1991, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had listed 595 plant and animal species
as endangered or threatened. Of this number 256 (43%) are wetland-dependent,
while wetlands provide essential habitat to 60% of all threatened and 40% of all
endangered species.
James F. Berry, Ecological Principles of Wetland Ecosystems, in WETLANDS 18, 56-57 (Mark S.
Dennison & James F. Berry eds., 1993).
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with location, vegetation, and soil type.
41
III. Federal Environmental Regulation and Land Use
For the reasons just given, progress in water pollution control and
wildlife protection will require land use restrictions. Since pristine water
and wildlife habitat can be achieved, at best, only in certain areas, any
rational policy will apply such controls more strictly in some places than in
others. Within the controlled areas, optimal environmental results might
require leaving certain ecologically vital lands undeveloped.
The framers of our environmental laws found two ways to ignore
these difficult questions of control and priority. The Clean Water Act-the
charter of federal water pollution control efforts-promises the
environmental benefits of pristine water everywhere and then
systematically denies the federal government any power to impose the land
use controls needed to achieve them. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
and the Endangered Species Act do impose real burdens on land use.
However, both statutes avoid any reference to issues that imposing these
burdens necessarily raises, such as regional land use priorities, federalism,
or property rights. Indeed, Section 404 does not even discuss the benefits
to be expected from restricting wetlands development. The ESA does state
a clear goal: protecting all listed species both against extinction and
against the taking of individual members. But it is equally barren of
references to other, countervailing factors and therefore gives little
guidance on how to accommodate conflicts between these unmentioned
factors and complete species protection.
A. The Clean Water Act
The Clean Water Act expressly established a national goal of
achieving water quality throughout the United States adequate to protect
"fish, shellfish and wildlife" by 1983.42 In choosing the means to pursue
these ends, however, Congress focused the statute on requiring uniform
controls on point sources like factories and sewage treatment plants
regardless of water quality impact. It imposed no controls on non-point
run-off from land use. This statutory avoidance of land use controls began
in 196543 and has, if anything, increased over time. Yet Congress and the
41 Similarly, the increase in flooding danger caused by the growth of impervious surface
and the cutting down of natural vegetation can be reduced, either by simple technological solutions like
dams and levees, or by preserving buffer zones along the stream to absorb flooding. Both alternatives
can effectively reduce flood damage, but the first approach has no collateral environmental benefits,
while the collateral environmental benefits of the second approach could be substantial.
42 See Clean Water Act § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2000).
43 In 1965 Congress for the first time debated a federal power to set water quality standards.
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EPA have simultaneously forbidden water-pollution regulators from
dealing realistically with the consequences of that avoidance.
1. The Clean Water Act and Land Use Control
The Clean Water Act defines a point source subject to regulation as
"any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" from which pollution
might enter the water.44 Read naturally, this language would often cover
run-off from irrigation, farming, forestry, or construction. Since 1965,
however, Congress has rejected any water-pollution restrictions that might
require land use controls, and the EPA has followed that lead. In 1977,
Congress declared that return flows from irrigated agriculture are not point
sources, even though the statutory definition of point source expressly
names ditches and even though irrigation return flows accounted for more
than half the pollution in some western watersheds.45 Congress later
extended this exclusion to run-off from all other agricultural operations
and, in qualified form, to run-off from mining and oil and gas production.46
In 1987, Congress authorized the EPA to exempt discharges from
municipal storm sewers-which collect wet weather run-off from city
streets-from the obligation to meet water quality standards, an obligation
imposed on all other point source discharges, including industrial storm
sewers. 47 Unwillingness to confront land use control was once again a
factor. Though municipal sewers are indisputably point sources subject to
Clean Water Act regulation, the flows they collect originate as run-off
The House rejected that authority, stating that:
[I]t would place in the hands of a single Federal official the power to establish
zoning measures over-to control the use of-land within watershed areas in all
parts of the United States. Such power over local affairs has never been vested in
a Federal official, and we are opposed to doing it now.
H.R. REP. NO. 89-215, at 9 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3313, 3322-23. The Senate
adopted this authority, but only after including multiple reassurances of its lack of hard and fast
meaning. See S. REP. No. 89-10, at 9-10 (1965) (noting that standards will not be used to "lock in"
existing high quality water uses and will not be enforced against sources absent a separate
determination that the resulting limits would be practicable). The final bill retained a limited water
quality standards authority, but imposed procedures that made these standards difficult to set and
enforce. H.R. REP. No. 89-1022, at 4-7, 9-13 (1965).
In 1972, Congress rejected central reliance on the water quality approach, with its inevitable
land use implications, in favor of a program of "best technology" controls on industrial sources. See
William F. Pedersen, Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 75-76 (1988).
44 Clean Water Act § 502(14).
45 Clean Water Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 33(b) (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000)); see also Pedersen, supra note 43, at 90.
46 See Clean Water Act Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4; see also Pedersen, supra
note 43, at 91 n.111-12.
47 Section 402(p)(3) of the Clean Water Act requires discharges from industrial storm
sewers to meet "all applicable provisions" of the Clean Water Act provisions that govern point sources,
including water quality standards. At the same time, it requires municipal storm sewer discharges only
to apply "controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable."
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from broad land areas, while industrial storm sewers typically collect from
more restricted regions. Reducing the discharge from municipal sewers
could require widespread land use controls. 48 The EPA has granted the
storm sewer exemption and regulates such discharges not according to
their effect on water quality, but according to an ambiguously defined
"best efforts" policy that specifically does not require land use controls.
49
Finally, in the face of massive resistance, the EPA in 2000 abandoned
a regulatory proposal to classify farm and forestry operations as point
sources in all areas where they contributed to water quality problems and
fell within a natural statutory reading of point source.
50
Proponents of regulatory exemptions for irrigation return flows, storm
sewers, farms, and forestry operations argued, with some justification, that
since control technology cannot effectively reduce pollution from land use,
land use pollution is an inappropriate target for the uniform application of
control technology around which Congress reconstructed the Clean Water
Act in 1972.51 The question whether control of such pollution is necessary
to achieve clean water is less relevant to the statutory architecture and was
not addressed. In effect, the statutory reliance on technology was used to
justify ignoring land use and water quality questions, even though these
48 The strictly legal case for the validity of tight storm sewer effluent limits would be very
strong, even if land use controls would be required to meet them. State and local governments
generally build and own the roads and parking lots that account for much of the impervious surface
that in turn leads to increased water pollution. Through road construction, zoning codes, and other land
use policies, they create the framework that makes much additional impervious surface construction
possible.
Local governments also build storm sewers to capture the storm flows created by the growth of
impervious surfaces and channel them for more controlled release. The sewer pipe itself is the
immediate source of the pollution discharge, whatever the ultimate origin may be. Both the Clean
Water Act and pollution control laws in general regulate such immediate sources. See 55 Fed. Reg.
47,990, 47,990-91 (Nov. 16, 1990). The municipality can therefore legitimately be regarded as both the
immediate source, through the discharge pipe, and the effective cause, through its own property and
land use polices and practices, of storm sewer pollution. Against this background, arguments that tight
storm sewer controls invade local planning autonomy could be countered with the claim that they were
no different in principle from regulating releases from municipal incinerators and landfills. See, e.g.,
New York v. United States, 504 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (stating that no constitutional issues are raised
by subjecting the states to "generally applicable" regulatory statutes); see also Pennsylvania v. EPA,
500 F.2d 246, 261 (4th Cir. 1974) (upholding the EPA's application of a similar logic to the control of
emissions from vehicles on highways). The EPA's most recent regulations for controlling storm sewer
discharges use a simpler version of this argument to justify imposing control requirements on sewers
operated by local governments. See 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,765-866 (Dec. 8, 1999).
Two federal circuits have recently upheld the EPA's authority to require municipal storm sewer
dischargers to regulate the conduct of their users. See City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 661-65
(5th Cir. 2003); Environmental Defense Center, Inc. v. EPA, 319 F.3d 399, 411-19 (9th Cir. 2003)
(accepting the EPA's argument).
49 See 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722 (Dec. 8, 1999).
50 See 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586,43,646-52 (July 13, 2000).
51 To support the deletion of irrigation return flows from the definition of point source, the
relevant Senate Committee said that "effluent limits based on technological methods may not be
appropriate for control of[irrigation] return flows." S. REP. No. 95-370, at 35 (1965).
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presented the most environmentally important issues.52
2. Water Quality Standards and Land Use Controls
Despite the Clean Water Act's denial of federal power to mandate
land use controls, EPA policy requires states to pretend that they can
always maintain water quality at 1975 levels, regardless of the degree of
land use control that would require. The statute directs states to establish
permissible pollution levels or "water quality standards," subject to
approval by the EPA, for all waters within the state's boundaries.53 The
EPA's regulations forbid any state's standards to allow a reduction in
water quality from the highest level reached since 1975.54
But a decline in water quality since 1975 might have resulted from an
increase in impervious surfaces caused by suburban development, or from
more extensive or intensive farming. Accordingly, strict protection of
water quality could require comprehensive controls on local land use
starting from 1975-controls that the statute gives the EPA no power to
require. The EPA's rules therefore rest on an unenforceable assumption
when they direct states to establish and maintain water quality standards as
if the negative effects of land use changes between 1975 and the present
did not exist, and as if no pollution-increasing land use changes would
occur in the future.
The Clean Water Act has also long required states to adopt
comprehensive plans to achieve water quality goals.55 Those plans must
52 Judge Leventhal observed long ago, in rejecting the EPA's attempt to exclude certain
categories of point sources from Clean Water Act permit requirements, that "[a]n exemption tends to
become indefinite: the problem drops out of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the
absence of crisis or a strong political protagonist." Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369,
1382 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The Clean Water Act's self-perpetuating avoidance of land use control issues
bears out the wisdom of that statement.
53 Clean Water Act § 303(a)(2)-(3).
54 The EPA's water quality regulation, 40 C.F.R. § 131 (2002), requires states to define
"uses" for each of their waters, such as supporting a cold water fishery, a warm water fishery, or
agricultural use. See § 131.2. It defines an "existing use" as any use that a water body would have
supported at any time on or after November 28, 1975, § 131.3(e), and then forbids any state to
designate in its water quality standards any use for any water body less demanding than an existing
use, § 131.10. The regulation thus creates a one-way ratchet whereby any use attained in the last
twenty-seven years becomes the regulatory minimum standard. The EPA based this policy on the
purposes clause of the Clean Water Act, which articulates a "national goal" to "restore and maintain"
the quality of the nation's waters. See Clean Water Act § 101(a).
55 The Clean Water Act contains several overlapping exhortations to this effect. See Robert
W. Adler, Integrated Approaches to Water Pollution: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 23 HARV.
ENvTL. L. REV. 203 (1999). Section 303 sets out the most ambitious of these provisions. It requires
states to identify those water bodies for which otherwise prescribed controls will be insufficient to
achieve water quality standards, to calculate the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) of pollution
consistent with achieving these standards, and to allocate it among the sources of that load. Section 303
also requires the EPA to promulgate TMDLs and allocations where a state declines to prepare an
adequate plan.
Section 303 does not prescribe any deadlines for state action and thus went unimplemented for
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include non-point source controls where needed to achieve this end.56
However, the statute denies the EPA power to enforce such plans against
57non-point sources.
The EPA, spurred by citizen suits, has enforced these planning
requirements far more vigorously in recent years. But the EPA's lack of
power either to implement such plans itself, or to impose costs on states
that do not implement them, restricts the federal government to the limited




The only Clean Water Act provision that directly addresses land
use-Section 404-requires a federal permit for any discharge of fill
material into "navigable waters." 59 Since such waters are defined
broadly, 6° this permit obligation extends to discharges into many wetlands
many years. Beginning in the late 1980s and continuing to the present day, a series of court opinions
set the program in motion, holding that so many years of state non-implementation amounted to a
constructive refusal to implement, which in turn required the EPA to prepare the plans instead. See,
e.g., Ala. Ctr. for the Env't v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 1994); Scott v. City of Hammond, 741
F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984); Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Ga. 1996); see also Oliver
A. Houck, TMDLS, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road to Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the
Clean Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,391 (1997).
56 Section 303 does not expressly require that TMDLs include non-point sources, but the
EPA has consistently read it to include them and the only decided case upholds that interpretation. See
Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
57 See Adler, supra note 55, at 228; Houck, supra note 55, at 10,399 ("[T]here are no
federal controls over non-point sources under the Clean Water Act."). Without the ultimate backstop of
federal power to enforce TMDLs against individual polluters, the federal "mandate" will provide little
incentive to states to adopt stricter controls than they would have adopted in its absence.
58 Those limited tools, however, could conceivably have a real effect. The establishment of
TMDLs will draw public attention to the problems they address and create at least a notional
regulatory framework to address them by establishing and allocating to sources and source types the
specific pollution reductions needed to achieve water quality goals. The planning exercise would
therefore change the information presented in the public dialogue even if it did not have binding legal
effect. Experience with other information disclosure programs has shown their power to change the
conduct of those subject to the disclosure. See generally William F. Pedersen, Regulation and
Information Disclosure: Parallel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 152 (2001).
59 Clean Water Act § 404(a). The courts have disapproved of the use of Section 404 to
forbid the draining of wetlands, holding that by no reasonable interpretation can a bar on filling a
wetland be construed to cover draining. See, e.g., Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs,
145 F.3d 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
60 "Waters of the United States," under the regulatory definitions, includes not just waters
actually used in interstate commerce, but also all other waters with any conceivable link to interstate
commerce. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2003) (as applied to the Army Corps of Engineers); see also 40
C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3) (2003) (as applied to the EPA). This regulation has been held to exceed federal
authority under the Commerce Clause. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 255-57 (4th Cir. 1997).
There is little doubt, however, that the Corps and the EPA could promulgate a valid regulation that
extended regulatory authority to many waters that would never meet a common law test of
navigability.
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61as well as into liquid water.
However, the statute contains no standards for permit issuance.62 The
implementing regulations likewise do not reference other land use plans,
lower levels of government, or property rights, much less any need to
reconcile federal decisions with these factors. They make clear that no
overall plan specifying which wetlands shall be preserved and which can
be developed will guide permit decisions. Only projects that would violate
water quality standards or harm endangered species are absolutely
barred.63 The applicable regulations also establish a rebuttable presumption
that developments in wetlands be approved only if they are "water
dependent," unless there is no feasible alternative. 64
Both the requirement for an individual permit and the water-
dependent condition focus on the use of individual tracts of land.
However, whether control of an individual tract is needed to protect water
quality or endangered species often will depend on the degree and type of
development allowed for all other parcels in the area. The case-by-case
approach of Section 404 cannot effectively address such regional planning
problems.
In theory, therefore, any wetland is potentially subject to filling
depending on the outcome of a case-by-case comparison of the ecological
damage of filling with the harm to the applicant from permit denial.
Indeed, the decision on a given project in a given wetland might differ at
different times depending on whether alternative sites had been developed
or were still available.65 Under this balancing test, the amount of wetlands
preservation, and the location of the preserved wetlands, tend to become a
function of the demand for wetlands development. No wetland, regardless
of its environmental value, ever receives permanent protection under
Section 404, since a new application will always require a new balancing.
Moreover, the Section 404 balancing test assumes both that some
development permits will always be granted-since otherwise the balance
would have no meaning-and that the development issue can always be
revisited for any particular wetland, since a permanent bar on development
would probably be a taking. This test, standing alone, would therefore tend
to allow the eventual development of all wetlands through continued
61 The Supreme Court ruled in Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531
U.S. 159 (2001), that Congress did not intend Section 404 jurisdiction to reach isolated ponds with no
connection to traditionally navigable waters. Since the Section 404 agencies have not amended their
regulations in response, the precise impact of this decision is still unclear.
62 See Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L.
REV. 21, 75 (2001) ("Section 404 of the CWA makes an exceptionally open-ended delegation of
regulatory authority. . . . The statute contains no standards at all for the exercise of this
authority ... ").
63 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(b)(1), (3).
64 See § 230.10(a)(3).
65 See Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36, 47-50 (2d Cir. 1988) (Pratt, J., dissenting).
Vol. 21:1I, 2004
Bargaining for Land Use Control
approval of some fraction of development applications.
In reality, two opposing factors complicate this analysis. On the one
hand, the permit requirement and the water-dependent test combine to
create an anticommons in which the expense of getting permission to
develop a wetland itself preserves wetlands without any affirmative
decision to preserve them. 66 On the other hand, political opposition to
regulatory burdens has removed from many wetlands such limited
protections as Section 404 provides. The Army Corps of Engineers, which
administers Section 404, has moved to diminish the permit burden on
wetlands owners by issuing "general permits" that grant automatic
permission to dredge or fill to anyone who falls within the permits'
description.67
When confined to a single parcel, a case-by-case approach also leads
to "split the baby" outcomes, in which some of the parcel is developed,
and some preserved, since to deny all development permission might
trigger a successful takings claim.
68
Effective environmental protection through land use control would
require discrimination in permissible uses over a broad area. Section 404's
ad hoc balancing tends to conflict both with use discrimination and state
planning regimes. Courts reviewing decisions under state or local zoning
laws have sometimes required them to be made in accordance with a
"comprehensive plan" and have rejected as unacceptably arbitrary spot
69zoning, decisions that depart from such a plan or are made without one.
From that perspective, review under Section 404 is also spot zoning, since
the federal government undertakes its review in a manner deliberately
inconsistent with any applicable general state land use plan.
66 See generally Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the
Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARv. L. REV. 621 (1998). Professor Heller has remarked that
"[a]s few as two regulatory bodies [with overlapping jurisdiction] may create [an anticommons] when
they resist coordination." Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163,
1187 n. 122 (1999) [hereinafter Boundaries of Private Property].
67 See 67 Fed. Reg. 2020 (Jan. 15, 2002) (reissuing nationwide permits by the Army Corps
of Engineers).
68 Professor Thompson discusses how the habitat conservation plan approach would allow
the government to move from an ESA implementation approach, based on preserving from
development fractions of the land of every subject landowner, to a biologically superior approach
based on preserving a single large undisturbed parcel by forbidding all development on selected
parcels. Without the ability to rely on a habitat conservation plan, the government would pick the ESA
implementation approach to minimize the risk of having to pay compensation. Habitat conservation
plans make the second approach available by effectively inducing those subject to ESA requirements
to pay to acquire the land. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in
Takings & Incentives, 49 STAN. L. REV. 305, 338-39 (1997).
69 See, e.g., Guerriero v. Galasso, 136 A.2d 497, 500 (Conn. 1957). Spot zoning can be
created both by more lenient treatment of development in a small area, as compared to the surrounding
community, and by less favorable treatment. See Palisades Props. v. Bmnetti, 207 A.2d 522, 533 (N.J.
1965); ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS
103 (1981).
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Other state land-use planning regimes operated more through a case-
by-case weighing of the equities.70 Section 404 conflicts with them as well
by imposing on planning an additional federal decision maker along with
extra process costs.
C. The Endangered Species Act
The ESA prohibits the taking of any animal that belongs to a species
listed by the federal government as endangered. 7' The implementing
regulations define "take" to include certain types of land use changes.
72
Their ambiguous language, which the Supreme Court has upheld against a
facial challenge,73 could theoretically prevent all development of land on
which endangered species breed, feed, or shelter. Such drastic restrictions,
however, would lead both to successful takings claims and to political
opposition.74 For these reasons, until the recent rise of bargaining
entitlement approaches, the ESA was enforced almost exclusively against
large private or governmental landowners.75 Those few cases in which the
government attempted to use its ESA powers for community land use
planning resulted in embarrassing and instructive political defeat.76
Congress applied the ESA's commands equally to every landowner
whose actions might take an endangered species. Yet, unless protecting the
70 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 995-1004 (4th ed. 1998).
71 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 9(a) (2002).
72 The term "take" includes "significant habitat modification or degradation where it
actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including
breeding, feeding, or sheltering." 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2003). This language goes considerably beyond the
statutory definition itself, which reads: "The term 'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." Endangered Species
Act § 3(19).
73 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comms. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
74 The statute also requires agencies that list endangered species to designate "critical
habitat" for those species "to the maximum extent prudent and determinable." Endangered Species Act
§ 4(a)(3). Critical habitat determinations are governed by a cost-benefit test unless the agencies
determine that a cost-benefit determination "would result in the extinction of the species concerned." §
4(b)(2). Unlike the takings bar, designation of critical habitat has no direct impact on private land-
owners; it serves only to require any federal agency that acts in a manner that might affect critical
habitat to consult with the relevant wildlife agency about the impact. For these reasons, the ESA
agencies have long downplayed the critical habitat provisions of the ESA in favor of relying on the
more straightforward takings bar. See Federico Cheever, Critical Habitat, in THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES 47, 54, 64 (Donald C. Baur & William R. Irvin eds.,
2002).
75 See Mark Sagoff, Muddle or Muddle Through? Takings Jurisprudence Meets the
Endangered Species Act, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 855 (1997) (citing a GAO report stating that
between 1985 and 1993 over ten times as many Americans (100) were killed by lightning as were
prosecuted for violating ESA provisions (8)).
76 The most notable of these examples involved the attempt to control residential
construction in Austin, Texas to protect the habitat of the golden-checked warbler, which provoked
almost universal bipartisan political backlash leading the Interior Department to promise not to
designate private land as critical habitat for endangered species. See CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L.
PLUMMER, NOAH'S CHOICE: THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED SPECIES 190-211 (1995).
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species requires barring all land development throughout its range, a more
limited set of restrictions could adequately achieve the statutory purposes.
Moreover, as with wetlands protection, the degree of restriction required
for one piece of land will probably be affected by the pattern of restrictions
imposed on all the others. A statute that articulates a broad and inchoate
burden on all land use alike cannot address such problems.
D. A Common Thread: Avoiding Conflict in Land Use Preferences
Despite the substantive differences in the programs just described, all
three have been shaped to avoid (or to allow agencies to avoid) any
wholesale conflict between program requirements and the autonomy
interests of state regulators and private property owners. But since any
attempt to protect the environment by private land use control will lead to
that conflict, the result is either ineffective programs or conflict shifted to
the level of individual decisions, or both.
By pretending that the nation's water pollution problems could be
solved without land use control, the Clean Water Act allowed legislators
and regulators to ignore both the need to designate specific land areas that
would achieve highest-quality water versus those that would not, and the
need to accommodate state, local, and private land use preferences in
making that choice.
Section 404's universal ad hoc approach avoids direct conflicts with
state, local, or private land use planning. The price of that avoidance is an
incoherent program that suppresses basic questions about which wetlands
should be preserved and where, just as the Clean Water Act suppresses
questions about how and where top quality water should be achieved.
Finally, the ESA's absolute takings bar subjects private landowners to
the prospect of ESA restrictions that will never be imposed, denies
endangered species the protections that a more explicit and enforceable
dedication of land to their interests might provide, and avoids critical
questions concerning how much private land to dedicate to species
protection and how to dedicate it.
77
In short, all three statutes qualify as examples of what Professor
Dwyer calls "symbolic environmental legislation.,18 Such legislation
77 Moreover, the imposition of a potential development ban on lands where endangered
species are present gives landowners an incentive to make sure that the species never becomes
established there, either by illegally killing any members that do become established, or by developing
the land before any of the species arrive. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prairie Chickens:
The Uncertain Search for Optimal Biodiversity, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153-54 (1999). The
implementing agencies have developed "tradable entitlement" approaches to address this problem as
well. See infra text accompanying notes 121-122 (describing "safe harbor" and "candidate
conservation agreement" policies).
78 John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233 (1990).
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declares ambitious ends to be achieved without providing the means to
realistically achieve them. In so doing, this legislation avoids politically-
charged conflicts with other important social interests that full
achievement of its declared ends would require.' 9
Since protection of state autonomy and private property rank among
the core values of our society, confronting and accommodating conflicts
between those interests and environmental protection will be needed to
establish land use controls. Our current environmental programs simply
hinder such efforts by pretending that environmental protection can be
achieved without addressing land use conflicts.
IV. Federal Land Use Versus Industrial Pollution Controls
Traditional regulatory tools have worked far better to control
industrial pollution than to address land use because land use planning,
unlike industrial pollution control, generally requires case-by-case
accommodation of sharply conflicting interests. Since federal government
regulation is particularly bad at resolving such problems, land use control
challenges it at a weak point.
A. Traditional Top-Down Regulation's Success: Industrial Pollution
Control
1. Non-Rival Commands
Economists call two separate goals "rival" when achieving one means
giving up the other.80 Reducing pollution from products and factories
generally is not rival to continued industrial activity. Technological
innovation, over time, can reduce almost to insignificance the conflict
between production and pollution. 81 For that reason, despite its substantial
expense, compliance with the past generation of environmental rules has
not required any fundamental choices among social values or significant
changes in consumption patterns or life style. 82 Factories of all types
79 Id. at 250 ("Symbolic legislation does not suppress the conflicts that arise in designing
and implementing a regulatory scheme; instead, it transfers those conflicts to agencies, and at times to
courts, for resolution.").
80 Two claims to eat the same hamburger are rival, since only one claimant can eat it. Two
claims to receive the same television signal are not rival because the signal can accommodate any
number of receivers within its range. See, e.g., TODD SANDLER, COLLECTIVE ACTION 6 (1992).
81 Since 1970, aggregate emissions of the six principal air pollutants have been cut 48%.
During that same time, the U.S. gross domestic product increased 164%, energy consumption
increased 42%, and vehicle miles traveled increased 155%. See EPA, LATEST FINDINGS ON NATIONAL
AIR QUALrrY: 2002 STATUS AND TRENDS 1 (EPA 454/K-03-001) (Aug. 2003), available at
http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/index.html.
82 In 1990, the EPA estimated the percentage of GNP devoted to environmental protection
at 2.1% in 1990, rising to 2.7% in 1997. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN
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continue to function while polluting less, and automobiles, gasoline,
pesticides, and new chemicals have remained available-only in more
environmentally friendly forms. The limited impact of such non-rival
decisions makes the inefficiencies of traditional regulation and its
inattention to the interests of the regulated entity easier to accept.
2. Fungible Commands
The limited information-processing capacity of traditional regulation
often leads it to apply the same requirements to many broad categories of
activities, for example, to all power plants, all new automobiles, or all
gasoline, Accordingly, such rules work best when environmental problems
are fungible, so that the same solution can be applied to many separate
instances of what is largely the same problem. Many of the areas
addressed by past generations of environmental regulation fit this model
reasonably well. Other problems that did not fit the model were redefined




Regulatory reform advocates often claim that market-based
approaches to environmental protection can overcome the inefficiencies
and intrusiveness of command and control. However, such approaches,
like command and control, require relatively non-rival problems with
fungible solutions if they are to work.
Under the cap and trade approach to pollution control, the
government prohibits any pollution release not covered by an allowance.
The number of allowances issued cannot exceed a "cap," while allowances
are freely transferable. The overall cap on allowances limits overall
releases to a predetermined figure. Making the allowances transferable
gives them a market-determined price. Firms whose control costs are
higher than the allowance price will buy allowances to cover their
emissions, while firms whose costs are lower will sell their allowances and
install controls. Thus the overall control burden falls automatically on the
lowest-cost controller. This approach also blunts regulatory intrusion into
private autonomy by allowing those to whom regulation is least palatable
ENVIRONMENT, A SUMMARY, 2-2 to 2-3 (Alan Carlin ed., 1990). A more recent analysis concluded
that this was still a defensible order-of-magnitude estimate. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. ECON., EPA,
WHAT Do WE SPEND ON ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/EE/epa/white.nsf/bd3a5276c012f0e685256c2c00570970/d631aad37b7717518
52567a9004b9aefOpenDocument (last visited Dec. 17, 2003).
83 See supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
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to avoid regulation by purchasing allowances instead. 4
Such approaches can work only if regulated entities can incorporate
the expense of allowances or pollution control into their operations as a
cost. That, however, assumes that the limits being imposed are not rival to
the underlying business activities that require and pay for the allowances
and controls that implement the limits.
The very freedom of choice that cap and trade programs grant
regulated entities can generate many different patterns of regulated
activity, depending on which covered entities choose to rely on allowances
and keep emissions high and which choose to rely on pollution controls.
Accordingly, market-based approaches will provide an assured level of
environmental protection only to the extent that the environmental benefits
from the different possible patterns of allowance usage are roughly
fungible, for example, if a reduction in air pollution will be of equal value
regardless of the source at which it takes place. 85
B. Land Use Control and Traditional Regulatory Approaches
1. Rival Commands
Land use control is far more inherently rival than traditional process
and product regulation. Technical advances are more likely to create an
automobile that combines mobility with no pollution than to create a
housing development or a shopping center that also serves as a wildlife
sanctuary, or that preserves intact the current state of a neighboring stream.
The potential impact of land preservation requirements on the autonomy of
a landowner who might lose the ability to control his property is clear. But
the potential impact on the autonomy of state and local governments that
might lose their ability to plan property use within their borders could be
equally substantial.
Moreover, the claims of landowners and state and local governments
to have their interests considered when such rival choices contradict their
preferences are more deeply rooted in our legal and political system than
the autonomy claims of industrial operations.86 These autonomy interests
84 Since firms that find ways to reduce their control costs will also reduce their allowance
purchase costs (or increase their allowance sale income), the market approach will also encourage
innovation in control approaches.
85 Market-based trading systems "must assume fungibility-that the things exchanged are
sufficiently similar in ways important to the goals of environmental protection-otherwise there would
be no assurance that trading ensured environmental protection." James Salzrnan & J.B. Ruhl,
Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (2000)
(emphasis in original).
86 The Supreme Court has recognized that control of land use is an inherently local
responsibility which the federal government has only debatable constitutional power to address. See
Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Supreme Court has
26
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enjoy both strong political support and at least some constitutional
protection and thus are hard to overcome through legislative or regulatory
action."
The need to choose among rival land uses will increase
disproportionately as environmental goals become more ambitious. While
preservation of rabbits or common songbirds in a suburb might require no
controls beyond ordinary zoning, preservation of pristine water quality in a
river or of habitat for a full range of "natural" wildlife species could rule
out most other uses of large areas and is therefore rival to them.
2. Fungible Commands
Controls on land will rarely be fungible. Different tracts of land will
have widely different values as pollution buffers, wetlands, or species
habitats. Even more fundamentally, problems of environmental land use
control tend to be polycentric in that restrictions imposed on any one
parcel to achieve some goal will reciprocally influence the restrictions
needed on all the other parcels. 88 Accordingly, it may often be impossible
to assess the environmental value of restrictions on a given tract without
considering the environmental restrictions imposed on others.
These factors make environmental protection through land use control
poorly suited to market-based regulatory approaches. A simple allowance
approach allowing X acres, and only X acres, to be developed in a given
area would probably result in a somewhat random distribution of
developed and undeveloped parcels, just as an allowance approach for
pollution control can yield a geographically disparate distribution of
emissions reductions. 89 Yet the judgment that each acre preserved from
likewise opined that state limits on the use of real property are more likely to trigger takings liability
than limits of the same stringency on personal property use. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1027-28 (1992).
87 For opposition to federal land use controls from property owners, see Salzman & Ruhl,
supra note 85, at 678 ("It is no secret that endangered species and wetlands [regulations] have long
served as lightning rods for property rights groups.... [E]very congressional session witnesses new
proposals to weaken the habitat protections of the ESA and CWA. This combination of public attack
and political threat has led to real, pounding pressure on the agencies."); see also Carol M. Rose,
Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1129 (1996) (reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, & POLrrIcs (1995)) ("After years of complaints by
farmers, miners, real estate developers, and timber interests, Congress is now besieged with proposals
to alter wetlands and endangered-species protections, and to curtail sharply the constraints that those
measures have imposed on landowners."). The siege of proposals has abated since these words were
written in 1996, but the pressures that created them have not diminished.
88 A polycentric problem is one in which the resolution of a given issue-such as whether
and how much to allow development of Tract A-cannot be answered without knowing the answer to
other, parallel problems-whether and how much Tracts B, C, and D will be developed. See Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 394-405 (1978).
89 Indeed, the pattern might be even more random. While the plants in an industry may all
have roughly similar pollution control cost curves, the factors that lead to the development of one
parcel of land and the preservation of another are likely to be more heterogeneous. Salzman and Ruhl,
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development is of equal value regardless of location is far less defensible
than such a judgment regarding pollution. Accounting for the differing
environmental values of land in different locations risks making a trading
system impossibly intricate because of the need for highly complex
formulas to determine the environmental value of the land in question.
90
Even apart from complexity, the very idea of a valuation formula for
individual parcels of land may conflict with the polycentric nature of land
use decisions. In many cases, control by individual landowners of their
own discharges may be inferior to a collective approach in which
undeveloped buffer zones, free from farming or impervious surface,
absorb the run-off from more developed areas, or in which pollution from
intensive development of broad areas is offset by keeping other areas
undeveloped. Similarly, large, unbroken areas might have far greater
ecological value as wetlands or endangered species habitat than individual
parcels. No simple system of allowance requirements could predictably
generate such a land use pattern, while the cost of devising a complex
trading system could easily exceed the cost of establishing a pattern by
direct action.
91
The problems do not end there. Other competing community
desires-for example, desires for residential land, recreational areas, or
business locations-also present polycentric problems. The decision
whether to allow a particular use in one place will influence the decision
after describing the lack of complete fungibility in pollutant emissions, add that "[i]n programs that
trade habitat, the problem of nonfungibility becomes even more accentuated because the parcels have
unique landscape characteristics." Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 85, at 694.
90 The proposals that have been made for market-based approaches to environmental land
use control make this point through their sheer complexity. According to Salzman and Ruhl, "in the
wetlands context one could imagine a currency that captured acreage, provision of key services
(biophysical capacity for nutrient filtration, floodwater retention, nursery habitat), and delivery of
services (size of local population affected)." Id. at 635. Similarly, a proposal for a market-based
approach to habitat conservation envisions assigning a habitat value to each parcel of land at issue
"using a predetermined formula based on habitat quality characteristics such as topographic diversity,
watershed integrity, and the presence of indicator species or invasive alien species." David Sohn &
Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the Tradable Permit Approach from Air
Pollution to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 405,413 (1996) (summarizing Todd G. Olsen
et al., The Habitat Transaction Method: A Proposal for Creating Tradable Credits in Endangered
Species Habitat, in BUILDING ECONOMIC INCENTIVES 31 (Wendy E. Hudson ed., 1994)). This
approach would "'take[] into account inherent habitat quality, patch sizes, connectivity and
fragmentation of habitat[,] . . . exposure of habitat to unprotected edges, and the general roundness of
the habitat configuration."' Id. at 413 n.32 (quoting Olsen et al., supra, at 31). Given the number and
complexity of the variables, and the way the "polycentric" nature of the problem at issue will cause
them to change value for each acre with the use assumed for each neighboring acre, the cost of creating
and using such a currency could well outweigh any benefits from its use.
91 In addition to these factors, the difficulty of measuring the performance of environmental
land use restrictions would itself be a fatal obstacle to federal implementation of land use controls. In
the water pollution context, the work necessary to measure the discharges from all the land owners
covered by a non-point source control program and then to assess the regulatory consequence of those
discharges would be so expensive, so intrusive, and so duplicative of state zoning and other land use
control efforts as to make its performance at the federal level impractical.
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whether to allow it somewhere else. Any final land use pattern would be
the integral of all these polycentric calculations, and any market-based
approach that attempted to accommodate all these separate factors would
need to be far more intricate than one that considered environmental
factors alone.
A different market-based approach could solve these fungibility
problems but would exacerbate the conflict between rival uses. Using such
an approach, the government would expressly limit development in certain
areas while simultaneously issuing transferable development rights
(TDRs) to all landowners in some broader region. Any new development
would need to be covered by more TDRs than were allocated to the owner
of the land on which it would be built.92 The owners of tightly restricted
land could then recoup some (perhaps all) of their losses by selling their
TDRs to the sponsors of such development projects.93 The TDR approach
allows the government to designate land to be protected and provides at
least partial compensation to the owners of that land. But since the federal
government would be making these decisions, it would invade state
autonomy more than our present system, since it would require federal
prescription of detailed land use patterns to give the TDRs value.
C. "Optimum Jurisdiction ": An Incomplete Solution
Rival choices become most problematic when they are imposed on a
group through the political power of another group. For that reason,
economically-oriented analysts seeking to guard against outside
exploitation of local communities argue that government services:
[S]hould be provided by the smallest jurisdiction that encompasses the
geographical expanse of the benefits and costs associated with the
service. In this way, all the benefits and costs are internalized [within the
jurisdiction], and, at the same time, we can take full advantage of
tailoring service levels to the particular tastes and other circumstances
that characterize the individual jurisdictions.'
92 Cf. John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975). See generally
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 70, at 1165-67.
93 The Supreme Court has suggested that issuance of TDRs to a developer can make a
government action not a taking even though they do not fully compensate for the diminution in value
caused by the regulation. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 137 (1978).
But see id. at 140-42 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Suitim v. Lake Tahoe Reg'l Planning Auth., 520 U.S.
725, 747 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94 Wallace E. Oates, On Environmental Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1321, 1323 (1997)
(citation omitted). Indeed, such a conclusion follows almost as a logical deduction from the
assumptions that governments exist to satisfy such preferences of their citizens as can only be met by
collective action, and that governments act reasonably effectively toward that goal. See also Bradley C.
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This approach, it is argued, protects residents of a smaller region
within a broader geographic area from the imposition of special regulatory
burdens by the majority. Following this logic, one might argue-as some
Supreme Court opinions suggest-that land use is an inherently local
problem and that the problems outlined above stem from federal
interference with local control.95 Though such reasoning undermines any
case for exclusive federal land use control, it does not show that exclusive
local control would be appropriate.
Land use in a given jurisdiction may create water pollution or
diminish supplies of water or wildlife far beyond the jurisdiction's
boundaries. It may also have environmentally damaging effects forbidden
by federal law within the jurisdiction itself.96 Yet any external imposition
of controls to prevent those harms would be rival to other potential
community land use choices.
In such circumstances, an overly narrow decision-making boundary
may lead to decisions that do not fully reflect the interests of downstream
residents or persons outside the jurisdiction, thus creating externalities.
Expanding the boundary to include all those beneficiaries may create a
majority for more protection that exploits the outvoted minority in the
vicinity of the resource to be protected.97 In such circumstances both the
interests of those who would bear the costs and the interests of those who
would enjoy the benefits are valid. "Optimum jurisdiction" logic by itself
provides no principled way to make a decision between the two interests.
To an important extent, the claims of each jurisdiction to exercise the same
power are rival just as different potential uses of the same land are rival.
D. The Problem of "Demoralization Cost"
An analysis borrowed from takings law describes why federal
regulatory land use restrictions meet resistance and points to a possible
solution.
Under the leading view of takings law, suggested by Professor
Michelman, compensation requirements are imposed to mitigate the
distress inflicted on property owners when government action invades
their justified expectations of using their property freely.98 Therefore, the
Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 75-76 (1997).
95 See infra note 145.
96 The federal courts of appeals have repeatedly upheld federal requirements to preserve
water quality and protect endangered species within the borders of a single state. See, e.g., Nebraska v.
EPA, 331 F.3d 995 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003);
GDF Realty Investments v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003).
97 Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 587-90
(1996).
98 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967). Michelman argues that
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higher the "demoralization costs" of a land use regulation, the more likely
it should be to trigger takings requirements. Similarly, federal land use
control efforts can generate demoralization costs for affected landowners,
for local governments, and for electorates whose regulatory land use
power would be overridden. These demoralization costs need not create a
constitutional infirmity to defeat regulation; the political resistance they
motivate will often be quite enough.99
By definition, demoralization costs are determined by (1) the extent
of the restriction imposed on the freedom of the regulated party and (2) the
degree to which the regulated party does not consent to that restriction.
1°°
Criminal law restricts our freedom of action, but since its restrictions are
generally accepted, its constraints are not demoralizing. Because land use
regulation tends to rule out alternative uses of the property at issue, and
because federal land use regulation would invade expectations that both
local governments and landowners believe should be protected, the
demoralization costs of federal land use regulation are generally high.
The Michelman analysis also suggests that demoralization costs could
be reduced by an approach to achieving environmental goals that (1)
reduces the cost of achieving such goals to those affected and (2) reduces
the invasion of the autonomy of the affected landowners and local
communities by giving them an effective voice in designing the
restrictions. As discussed above, however, our current regulatory approach
can neither select the least-cost approach to regulation nor give those with
strong rival interests an adequate voice in shaping the rules. The balance of
this Article discusses how bargaining entitlements are beginning to address
these problems, and how they could be employed more systematically in
the future.
compensation should be due whenever a government act invades reasonable landowner expectations so
much that the resulting demoralization costs exceed the transaction costs of providing compensation.
99 See supra note 87.
100 Michelman's article did not clearly identify the basis on which demoralization costs rest.
To fill that gap, many commentat6rs have noted as fact, and urged as desirable, that only those
restrictions on land use that violate community values should constitute a compensable taking. See,
e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use
Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 729 (1973); Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An
Economic and Legal Analysis, 86 YALE L.J. 385, 418-24 (1977). That approach implies that the types
of government acts that constitute a taking might well change with changing community values.
Fischel, in endorsing this approach, notes how evolving values have changed our social approach to
pollution control and might change our approach to land use as well:
Three generations ago, Pigou suggested that firms that reduced pollution should
be paid subsidies .... This implied that clean air was a social benefit for which
compensation should be made, rather than a social cost on which taxes should be
imposed. The ecological revolution is surely one in which standards of what is
normal behavior have changed.
FISCHEL, supra note 87, at 354.
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V. Bargaining Entitlements Today
The federal agencies responsible for water pollution control, wetlands
preservation, and endangered species protection'01 have already begun
reshaping their regulatory tools into bargaining entitlements.'
0 2
A. Water Pollution Control
The Clean Water Act, as shown above, exempts from mandatory
regulation the non-point sources that account for over half of all water
pollution. At the same time, it requires point sources to install best-
technology controls without regard to water quality need or impact.
A recent EPA policy allows regulated point sources some freedom to
meet their control obligations, not by directly reducing their own pollution
discharges but by procuring the reduction of discharges from non-point
sources instead. 03 Whenever non-point source controls can achieve a
given level of water quality more cheaply than point source controls, an
exchange of control obligations can lead both to reduced overall pollution
control cost and improved water quality.
These non-point source controls can consist of land use restrictions
imposed by covenant or contract1 °4 Accordingly, a trade between point
and non-point sources can transform the federal obligation to install
101 Although the EPA alone administers the Clean Water Act, the Army Corps of Engineers
and the EPA share responsibility for implementing Section 404. See Clean Water Act § 404(a)-(d), 0).
The ESA is administered by the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Department of Commerce for
all marine animals except sea otters and sea turtles on land, and by the Fish and Wildlife Service in the
Interior Department for all other animals. See Donald C. Baur & William R. Irvin, Introduction to THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 74, at xi.
102 . A fourth example could have been added as well. The Safe Drinking Water Act requires
all drinking water systems to achieve prescribed levels of freedom from contamination by bacteria and
other micro-organisms. Economic development of a watershed increases the levels of these organisms
in surface water. Accordingly, the implementing EPA regulations give communities the choice of
achieving these levels either through end-of-the-pipe treatment technology, or by preserving their
reservoirs' watershed from development. Since controlling development is often less expensive than
installing the technology, a number of communities-most notably New York City-have elected to
comply through land use restrictions. New York City decided that it would be wiser:
[T]o invest $1-1.5 billion in restoring and protecting the Catskill watershed . . .
than to construct a $4-8 billion filtration plant that also would have raised
difficult siting problems. New York City plans to spend over a quarter million
dollars purchasing and preserving 335,000 acres of land as a buffer from
pollution and, incidentally, as habitat for a diverse assortment of species.
Thompson, supra note 77, at 1174 (citations omitted). Other metropolitan areas are adopting similar
programs. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 261, 298-300 (2000).
103 See 68 Fed. Reg. 1,608 (Jan. 13, 2003) (announcing the EPA's Final Policy on Water
Quality Trading); EPA DRAFT FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHED-BASED TRADING (EPA 800-R-96-001)
(May 1996), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradetbl.html [hereinafter EPA
DRAFT FRAMEWORK].
104 EPA DR.AFr FRAMEWORK, supra note 103, at 7-15.
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effluent controls on a factory into an easement or contract, paid for by the
factory, that restricts the use of private land. The EPA predicts that the
ability to trade will lead to a regional- and community-based approach to
selecting the areas whose use will be restricted,0 5 and that trading will also
encourage selection of areas whose preservation will have collateral




Under the current case-by-case approach to wetlands protection, no
wetland receives permanent protection. Instead, each request to fill a
wetland leads to a separate permit proceeding. An alternative approach,
wetlands mitigation, turns the obligation to get a permit before any
wetland is developed into permanent protection of selected wetlands.' °7
Applicants seeking to fill a wetland receive their permit if they create new
wetlands in a designated restoration area or arrange permanent protection
for existing wetlands particularly threatened by development. 0 8 The
105 The EPA has suggested that:
Trading brings watershed stakeholders-regulated sources, nonregulated
sources, regulatory agencies, other interested organizations, and the general
public-together and engages them in a partnership to solve water quality
problems....
Trades draw on the expertise and local knowledge of stakeholders to ensure
that trading projects have their support. A trading option can serve as a
consensus-building exercise, leading to more cooperative, comprehensive
solutions. Such solutions can provide benefits that might not have been captured
in a traditional regulatory approach, such as increased identification and control
of cumulative effects (e.g., habitat degradation).
Id. at 2-10 to 2-11.
106 The EPA's Final Water Quality Trading Policy, supra note 31, at 3, expressly states that
the EPA supports trading approaches that "[c]ombine[] ecological services to achieve multiple
environmental and economic benefits, such as wetland restoration or the implementation of
management practices that improve water quality and habitat."
However, the conflated nature of Clean Water Act obligations has discouraged the full
development of this approach. As detailed above, the statute requires each discharger to meet a given
level of control regardless of water quality need. Consequently, the EPA's Water Quality Trading
Policy forbids exchanges that would increase point source discharges above the technology-based
effluent limits, even if reductions of greater water quality benefit were offered elsewhere. Id. at 6. In
addition, the EPA's bar on any downgrading of water quality standards below 1975 levels forbids any
offer of such downgrading in return for adoption of all the measures-including land use controls-
needed to preserve water quality elsewhere against future development. Both restrictions are
inconsistent with the need to discriminate by region to achieve effective water quality protection.
107 See 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(r) (2003) (Army Corps of Engineers); 40 C.F.R. § 230.1(d) (2003)
(EPA). The Corps of Engineers regulations also allow permit applicants to simply pay money in lieu of
compensating their environmental damage in kind where an in-kind offset would be too difficult. See
65 Fed. Reg. 66,914 (Nov. 7, 2000); 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,613 (Nov. 28, 1995). In such a case, the
conversion of the permit requirement into a bargaining entitlement is even clearer than in the case of
wetlands banking. For a description and criticism of this practice, see Royal C. Gardner, Money for
Nothing? The Rise of Wetland Fee Mitigation, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2000).
108 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605 (Nov. 28, 1995). The policy expresses a preference for creation of
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implementing agencies have made clear that the new or protected wetlands
must be fully sheltered against development under state property law. 10 9
Originally, mitigation was restricted to actions elsewhere on the
property covered by the permit. Increasingly, however, agencies have
accepted mitigation outside the property as well." 10 The ability to select the
wetlands to be preserved or restored from a broader area increases the
potential environmental benefits of wetlands mitigation."' Such off-site
mitigation also allows wetlands entrepreneurs to create new wetlands
prospectively and put them in a "bank." Developers can then acquire
banked wetlands to offset their own wetlands destruction. The
implementing agencies expect the growth of wetlands banks both to help
create and preserve large tracts of wetlands in ecologically valuable areas
and to reduce administrative costs. 112 Though experience with many
created wetlands has been disappointing, it may be possible to correct
these problems without abandoning the banking approach.113
new offsetting wetlands as the proper mitigation course, with preservation of existing wetlands
authorized only if they are ecologically important and "are under demonstrable threat of loss or
substantial degradation due to human activities that might not otherwise be expected to be restricted."
60 Fed. Reg. at 58,609.
Such an approach will lead to a net loss of wetlands by sometimes permitting their
uncompensated destruction. But it could still be a rational regulatory move if the permitting authority
knew that it would be unable to deny all Section 404 applications. In that case, the mitigation rule
would at least assure that for every acre of wetland destroyed, one or more compensating acres
(depending on the required offset ratio) would be permanently removed from commercial availability
and protected by a property rule.
109 See 60 Fed. Reg. at 58,612 ("The wetlands... in a mitigation bank should be protected in
perpetuity with appropriate real estate arrangements (e.g., conservation easements, transfer of title to
Federal or State resource agency or non-profit conservation organization).").
110 See J.B. Ruhl & R. Juge Gregg, Integrating Ecosystem Services into Environmental Law:
A Case Study of Wetlands Mitigation Banking, 20 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 365, 369-72 (2001).
111 The National Research Council, comparing on-site mitigation of the impacts of permits to
fill wetlands with mitigation not geographically restricted, has stated that:
On-site compensation is typically constrained by hydrological conditions that are
likely to have been or are being modified by the developments requiring
mitigation .... Proper placement within the landscape of compensatory wetlands
to establish hydrological equivalence is necessary for wetland sustainability....
Thus, opportunities for in-kind compensation need to be sought within a larger
landscape context.
COMPENSATING FOR WETLANDS LOSSES, supra note 37, at 4; see also Virginia C. Veltman, Banking
on the Future of Wetlands Using Federal Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 654, 673 (1995) (stating that, as
opposed to on-site mitigation, "offsite mitigation provides a greater selection of hydrologically and
ecologically favorable locations, thus increasing the opportunity for a well-functioning replacement"
(citations omitted)).
112 The policy states that wetlands mitigation banking "typically involves the consolidation
of small, fragmented wetland mitigation projects into one large contiguous site." See 60 Fed. Reg. at
58,606. The wetlands bank can even include upland areas "to the degree that such features increase the
overall ecological functioning of the bank." 60 Fed. Reg. at 58,609.
The policy adds that, "[b]y consolidating compensation requirements, banks can more
effectively replace lost wetland functions within a watershed, as well as provide economies of scale
relating to the planning, implementation, monitoring and management of mitigation projects." 60 Fed.
Reg. at 58,606.
113 See infra Section VI.B.
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Both the opportunity to mitigate and its more recent off-site
expansion increasingly convert the permit obligation into a bargaining
entitlement. Rather than directly limiting the damaging impacts of
wetlands development, regulators exact a compensating price for wetlands
destruction. Indeed, the widely articulated goal of "no net loss" of
wetlands" 4 would make no sense without the mitigation requirement,
since the existence of the Section 404 permit program assumes that some
fraction of permits applied for will be granted. Without a mitigation
requirement, some form of wetlands loss would therefore be inevitable.
C. Endangered Species Protection
In 1982, Congress amended the ESA to allow its administrators to
moderate the absolute bar on takings by allowing the "incidental take" of
endangered species by applicants who submitted a mitigation plan to
minimize the impact of their activities on the species in question, as long
as they could find that the impact after mitigation "will not appreciably
reduce the likelihood of the survival ... of the species in the wild."
'"15
The incidental take provision of the ESA encourages designers of
projects that might take endangered species to undertake additional
compensating actions that make the total impact incidental.' 1 6 In the past
ten years, the implementing agencies have developed that logic into three
separate programs, only loosely reflected in the statutory language, that
use the statutory takings bar as a bargaining entitlement tradable for
actions that the government could not otherwise command.
114 The agencies that administer the Section 404 program adopted a "no net loss of the
Nation's wetlands" policy in 1990, and tied it expressly to the mitigation requirement. 55 Fed. Reg.
9210 (Mar. 12, 1990); see also COMPENSATING FOR WETLANDS LOSS, supra note 37, at 71.
115 Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 10(a)(2)(B)(iv).
116 Indeed, that was the original motivation for the provision. It was enacted to allow the
Interior Department to accept a plan worked out by local governments, developers, and landowners in
California to allow new construction in part of the habitat of two endangered butterflies as long as
other parts of the habitat were fully protected. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 31-32 (1982). One
commentator (a career environmentalist) has described its significance as follows, in language that in
effect also outlines the potential benefits of tradable entitlements:
In practice, neither the takings prohibition nor the [broad regulatory] definition of
"harm" had any apparent effect on the activities of private landowners before
1982. Even if private landowners were aware that they had any responsibilities
under the ESA, they didn't approach the agency for permission that they knew it
had no authority to give, and the agency simply wasn't about to provoke a
conflict over private land use in which its position could only have been that the
law flatly prohibits certain uses, without exception.
Thus, the 1982 amendments to the Act did the opposite of what they
appeared to do. On the surface, they appeared to weaken the Act by creating a
new exception to its nearly absolute prohibition against taking. In reality, they
gave the [government] its first practical means of influencing what private
landowners did on their land.
Michael S. Bean, The Endangered Species Act and Private Land: Four Lessons Learned From the
Past Quarter Century, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,701, 10,708 (1998).
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The most developed of these three programs allows a project to go
forward as long as the affected landowner undertakes enough offsetting
mitigation through a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP) to reduce any
resulting take to incidental levels. The implementing agencies have
formally adopted a "No Surprises" policy, committing not to seek any
additional mitigation from a landowner with an approved plan without
paying for it." 7 Under that approach, the approval of a mitigation plan re-
establishes, for the term of the plan, the landowner's property rights as
they existed before enactment of the ESA. To date, the Interior
Department has approved over 400 HCPs covering more than thirty-eight
million acres."l
8
Many HCPs have resulted from cooperative efforts among large
landowners, developers, the federal government, and state and local
governments. The enlistment of government power has made possible the
development of locally-based, sophisticated approaches that impose
development restrictions in varying degrees on private, state, and federal
lands, and that provide financial support for plan development to
supplement incentives provided by the bargaining entitlement itself.1 9 The
Interior Department claims that this approach has improved environmental
protection and distributed compliance costs more justly. 
20
117 Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859 (Feb.
23, 1998).
118 U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Habitat Conservation Program,
available at http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/index.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2003).
119 As of 2000, 14% of the area covered by HCPs was covered by plans developed
exclusively by private entities, 18% by HCPs developed exclusively by public entities, and 67%, by
"multiple jurisdiction" plans. USING SCIENCE, supra note 36, at 14. According to Professor Thompson,
Although local development mitigation fees have been the predominant means of
financing habitat preservation in regional HCPs, the federal and state
governments have agreed to contribute approximately 60 percent of the cost of
the Coachella Valley HCP, 50 percent of the cost of the proposed San Diego
County HCP, and significant portions of the expense of other regional HCPs.
Thompson, supra note 78, at 320.
120 [L]arge-scale, regional HCPs can significantly reduce the burden of the
ESA on small landowners by providing efficient mechanisms for compliance,
distributing the economic and logistical impacts of endangered species
conservation among the community, and bringing a broad range of landowner
activities under the HCPs' legal protection. In addition, these large-scale HCPs
allow for ecosystem planning, which can provide benefits to more species than
small-scale HCPs. Large-scale HCPs provide the [ESA agencies] with a better
opportunity for analyzing the cumulative effect of their projects, which is more
efficient than the piecemeal approach that could result if each landowner
developed his/her own HCP.
63 Fed. Reg. at 8865.
The record appears to bear out the claim that HCPs generate protection for broad areas,
widespread community involvement, and innovative approaches. At the end of 1999, 16 HCPs, each
covering a minimum of 100,000 acres, together covered a total of at least five million acres. See 65
Fed. Reg. 35,242, 35,248 tbl.l (June 1, 2000). Some of these plans cover entire urbanizing areas and
finance habitat conservation through impact fees on new development or the in-kind contribution of
habitat by developers as an offset to their projects. See Karen L. Donovan, HCPs-Important Tools for
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The ESA agencies have also adopted a safe harbor policy, under
which landowners who voluntarily undertake measures on their land that
benefit endangered species can undo these measures without triggering
ESA obligations, even if a take of an endangered species will result. 12 1
Without this policy, such voluntary measures could increase the regulatory
burden on the land by attracting more endangered animals, which would
then enjoy ESA protection. A conceptually similar candidate conservation
agreement policy allows owners of land harboring a species that might be
listed as endangered in the future to implement a set of measures currently
deemed adequate to protect that species against the threat of extinction. In
return, the government will agree not to require any additional protective
measures if the species should actually be listed.
122
In all three of these cases, the government trades a limit on its
regulatory entitlement to enforce the take provisions of the ESA for
measures that it could not readily have commanded directly.
VI. The Benefits of Regulatory Entitlement Bargaining
A. Reduced Demoralization Costs and Improved Environmental
Protection
Allowing regulatory entitlement bargaining permits the regulated
entity to offer, and the government to accept, types of compliance not
contemplated by the original regulation. That, in turn, can reduce in four
different ways the demoralization costs that make federal land use controls
difficult.
First, entitlement bargaining allows regulated parties to suggest
different ways to achieve the regulatory objectives. By definition, any
acceptable suggestion will be more attractive both to the regulated entity
and to the agency than compliance with the established approach.
123
Second, such offers might commit regulated entities to something that
an agency had no power to command, but that the agency valued more
Conserving Species, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
74, at 319, 323-26 (describing the Washington Department of Natural Resources, Riverside, Orange
County, Sacramento Valley, Plum Creek, and Cedar River HCPs); Patrick W. Ryan et al., ESA
Compliance Options: Section 10 and Other Tools, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY
AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 74, at 297, 309-10 (describing HCPs for Riverside, San Diego, Kern,
and Orange Counties in California, and for Clark County, Nevada).
121 Announcement of Final Safe Harbor Policy, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,717 (July 17, 1999).
122 Announcement of Final Policy for Candidate Conservation Agreements with Assurance,
64 Fed. Reg. 32,726 (June 17, 1999).
123 Most concretely, bargaining entitlements would substantially reduce the cost of
regulatory compliance. The EPA has estimated that flexible approaches to achieving water quality
standards could save $900 million annually compared to the least flexible approach. FINAL WATER
QUALITY TRADING POLICY, supra note 31, at 1-2.
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than compliance with the original regulatory obligation. Once the
government had become aware of this alternative, it would have to bargain
for it. The entitlements approach thereby confers on the regulated party a
limited ability to say no to the regulators. That, in turn, can reduce
demoralization costs caused by the "comply or be a violator" nature of
traditional regulation.
Third, entitlement bargaining motivates each entitlement holder to
persuade other parties that its favored trade promotes their interests as
well. Where the parties are collective entities-for example, a federal
regulatory agency or a local government-this dialogue can include
appeals by each party to the constituents of the other. To the extent that
such efforts succeeded, they would narrow the gap between the positions
of the parties and thus reduce the demoralization costs to each party of
accepting the other's position. 124 Much current regulatory reform literature
celebrates the virtues of using consensus and negotiation to develop
regulatory commands without giving comparable attention to improving
the incentives to reach agreement. 125 Use of bargaining entitlements could
supply that missing piece.
Fourth, these mechanisms give the regulated entities a greater voice in
shaping obligations to which they must conform. That greater voice can
itself reduce demoralization costs, even when the regulated entity's
specific suggestions are not accepted.
B. Increased Regional and Local Involvement
In addition to changing the direct relationship between the regulator
and regulated as just described, bargaining entitlements would reduce
demoralization costs by expanding the framework for regulatory decisions.
Land use planning issues are regional by definition, since problems
that are insoluble in the context of a single tract may be resolved by
dedicating different parts of a broad area to different uses. A bargaining
entitlements approach therefore motivates those pursuing trades to develop
regional approaches in order to make federal regulators a more attractive
offer. Since land use planning is overwhelmingly a state or local function,
these traders would have to enlist the relevant state and local governments
in developing such offers. The chance to help constituents and to reduce
their own federal burdens would motivate those governments to
124 According to one observer, pressure from "property owners themselves, who saw the
quality of their own lives crumbling before the congestion and pressure of continuing, unchecked
development," provided one reason for the success of the regional HCP developed in southern
California to conserve the California gnatcatcher and other species. Oliver A. Houck, On the Law of
Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV. 869, 964-65 (1997).
125 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45
UCLA L. REv. 1, 22-27, 40-49, 69-72 (1997).
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cooperate.126 This scaling up of compliance efforts could convert case-by-
case federal controls into state land use planning regimes. By integrating
otherwise conflicting sets of rights and values into a single plan, such
scaled-up compliance efforts could reduce or eliminate the need for
reconciliation through individual proceedings. A regulatory system that
resolved conflicts generically would burden regulated parties less than one
that resolved them on an individual basis. Moreover, that generic
resolution would arise out of local political processes in which regulated
entities would have a significant voice, increasing acceptance of the
regulations.
Federal regulation of private land cannot mandate ambitious levels of
water quality or wildlife habitat protection if that would require barring
most or all development in specifically defined areas. It tends instead to
impose the same moderate requirements everywhere regardless of
ecological effectiveness. 127  A scaled-up approach could cure this
deficiency and focus nature protection efforts where they would be most
significant. It could induce local governments or very large private
landowners to dedicate land they own to nature protection, or to purchase
land for that purpose. It could allow the imposition of impact fees on
development to finance land purchases 128 and provide a forum for
contributing third-party resources toward a mutually acceptable result. The
scaled-up approach could also create a vehicle for paying those whose
freedom to deal with their property was affected by the plan, even if the
restrictions would not trigger constitutional takings requirements.
29
Local government involvement would also reduce the demoralization
costs of the regulatory program. To the extent that local governments
previously owned the land now dedicated to natural uses, the burden on
private landowners would be reduced. Even if the government commanded
such a dedication by rule, the local origins of that command would make it
126 At least where the ESA was concerned, governments might take part in these plans, not
just out of desire to please their constituents, but also to resolve their own liabilities. See Strahan v.
Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Palila v. Hawaii Dep't of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985
(D. Haw. 1979), affd, 639 F.2d 495 (1981).
127 See supra note 70.
128 The scaled-up HCPs adopted in recent years already use many of these tools. See supra
notes 116-120 and accompanying text.
129 Several commentators have suggested such payment of non-required compensation. In
particular, Heller and Krier argue that compensation to a fund or government body that can stand as a
surrogate for those affected might be appropriate in cases where the transaction costs of compensating
those affected individually exceed their demoralization costs, so that no compensation would be due
under the Michelman formula. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution
in the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REv. 997, 1000, 1009-15 (1999). Such "general distribution"
would discourage government actions when costs exceeded their benefits by making the government
pay for the actions and would provide a measure of indirect compensation to those affected. See
Michelman, supra note 98, at 1252-54, for a similar suggestion. Entitlements trading would call forth
intergovernmental negotiations and provide a natural venue for negotiating and making such transfer
payments.
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more legitimate, and hence less demoralizing, than federal imposition of
similar requirements.
C. Improved Ability to Achieve Real, Rather Than Symbolic, Statutory
Objectives
Legislatures enact symbolic legislation in response to political
incentives. Since any attempt to reform such legislation might be resisted
for the same reasons that led to its enactment, Professor Dwyer has argued
that implementing agencies should take the lead in moving such statutes
toward reality.13° However, Dwyer suggests no mechanisms for agencies
to accomplish this result.'3 ' Bargaining entitlements would offer agencies
a new and powerful method of making such corrections.
Symbolic environmental statutes articulate broad goals without
establishing means adequate to attain them. Entitlement bargaining
reverses that process. By making the regulatory obligation tradable, it
focuses attention on the neglected relationship between ends and means
and, in particular, on the extent of the ends that the authorized means
would support. Each offer for an entitlement trade would embody a claim
that the offered trade would achieve statutory ends more effectively than
the legislatively mandated means. Responding to such offers would force
the agency to set forth its view of the nature of the statutory ends and the
adequacy of the statutory means, thus clarifying the policy choices at
issue.
132
There are at least two types of symbolic statutes. One type, which the
Clean Water Act exemplifies, grants the agency powers that it can use in
practice but that are insufficient to achieve the statutory ends. Trades under
such a statute would likely suggest alternatives to the statutory means. For
example, the agency could approve substitution of land use controls for
controls on factory discharges. Such trades would suggest the desirability
of revising the statute to emphasize land use control more, and control of
industrial discharges less.
In another case, exemplified by the ESA, the statutory means look
effective on paper to achieve their ends but ignore too many countervailing
factors to be achieved in practice. 133 Here, trades would probably call for
130 See Dwyer, supra note 78, at 246-47, 311-12. Dwyer claims that agencies proceed with
an integrity of policy choice and respect for facts exceeding what can be expected of legislatures and
with a sensitivity to legislative intent and political feasibility exceeding what can be expected of courts.
131 Dwyer, despite his endorsement of agency initiative to fix symbolic statutes, offers no
mechanism other than lenient judicial review for allowing agencies to make these adjustments. See id.
at 311-13.
132 For a detailed discussion of this point, see Pedersen, supra note 22, at 1091-99 (2001).
133 Dwyer's original example of a symbolic statute was of this nature. It focused on the
EPA's failure to implement the Clean Air Act provisions requiring the elimination, with an "ample
margin of safety," of any public health risk from hazardous air pollutants, a requirement that proved
40
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substituting more limited and concrete means for these paper commands,
and thus suggest the desirability of moving the statute in the same
direction.
Both types of trades could move the regulatory system toward greater
integration of its goals with other social values, and greater realism in its
specification of the means to achieve those goals. This would replace our
current conflation of ends and means with an approach that distinguished
between them clearly and focused attention on the adequacy of the
authorized means to achieve their ends.
D. Increased Constitutional Defensibility of Environmental Protection
Measures
Recent Supreme Court decisions have tightened the constitutional
restrictions on Congress' power to legislate under the Commerce Clause,
particularly when addressing topics of traditionally local concern.
Furthermore, land use regulation is always vulnerable to invalidation by a
takings challenge. A bargaining entitlements approach could do much to
reconcile the land use controls needed for environmental progress with
federalism concerns and could make a smaller, but still significant,
contribution to resolving takings controversies.
1. Federalism and the Commerce Clause
Congressional power to regulate commerce consists of powers to
regulate the channels and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, things
in interstate commerce, and intrastate activities that affect interstate
commerce. 3 4 The Supreme Court has long recognized Congress'
essentially unrestricted power to regulate channels, instrumentalities, and
things in commerce. 135 For over fifty years ending in 1995, congressional
power to regulate intrastate activities affecting interstate commerce
seemed equally unrestricted.1
3 6
Since then, however, the Lopez 137 and Morrison'38 cases have stated
that the commerce power is limited to addressing actions that significantly
impossible to implement as written because it could have forced the shutdown of many industries. See
Dwyer, supra note 78, at 236-50.
134 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
135 See, e.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); The Shreveport Rate Cases,
234 U.S. 342 (1914); S. Ry. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
136 The high water mark, and the governing precedent, was Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I 11
(1942), in which the court upheld regulation under the Commerce Clause of the cultivation of wheat on
a farm for consumption by the farm's residents.
137 514U.S. at 549.
138 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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affect interstate commerce; 139 that the link between the acts being
regulated and interstate commerce cannot be too attenuated; 40 that, in
making these judgments, the impacts of individually insignificant but
collectively important acts can be aggregated for analytical purposes only
if they are economic in nature;' 4' and that a special showing is needed to
justify federal regulation of "areas ... where States historically have been
sovereign.' 42 The Court has suggested that even where some federal
regulation of a traditionally local activity might be proper, the Constitution
would still forbid regulation that invades "each and every aspect" of that
activity. 14 These varying formulations signal a new judicial willingness to
consider impact on state autonomy in determining the constitutional
validity of Commerce Clause legislation. Indeed, the Court's new
emphasis on a link to interstate commerce may be best explained as
another method of preserving state autonomy. 1
44
The use of bargaining entitlements would reduce the impact on state
autonomy needed to achieve any given end. By leaving states with wider
discretion to select the means to achieve that end than direct regulation
would allow, bargaining entitlements would minimize the invasion of
areas in which states have traditionally been sovereign and would avoid
occupying "each and every aspect" of the fields it regulated. Since the
Supreme Court clearly regards a state's power to control land use as an
139 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
140 See id. at 567 ("To uphold the Government's contentions here, we would have to pile
inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the
Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.").
141 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613 ("While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our
Nation's history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature."); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 565-66 ("We do not doubt that Congress has
authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate numerous commercial activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce." (emphasis added)).
142 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
143 Id. at 565-66.
144 According to Justice Souter, this is true for the distinction on which the Court relied in
both Lopez and Morrison between "economic" activity that can be freely regulated and "noneconomic"
activity that cannot be as freely regulated:
[T]he formalistic economic/noneconomic distinction .. is useful in serving a
conception of federalism. It is the instrument by which assertions of national
power are to be limited in favor of preserving a supposedly discernible, proper
sphere of state autonomy to legislate or refrain from legislating as the individual
States see fit.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 644-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Other cases suggest in a similar vein that in determining the validity even of legislation that falls
within the outer boundaries of the Commerce Clause, the courts should also consider its impact on
state autonomy. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 177 (1992). Similarly, the Lopez Court
expressly endorsed the proposition that Congress may not 'use a relatively trivial impact on
commerce as an excuse for broad general regulation of state or private activities."' Lopez, 514 U.S. at
558 (quoting with approval Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 197 n.27 (1968)) (emphasis added).
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essential part of its constitutionally protected autonomy, 45 such impact
reduction should improve the constitutional defensibility of federal land
use control measures.
That conclusion is buttressed by the formal similarity of bargaining
entitlements to conditional federal spending, a means of pursuing federal
ends that the Supreme Court has upheld in cases where it would have
forbidden direct regulation of states. Cases rejecting Congress' authority to
commandeer directly the powers of state and local governments expressly
endorse Congress' power to achieve the same purposes by imposing
conditions on federal grants or by establishing a federally administered
regulatory system that the states can displace by agreeing to do precisely
the same thing themselves. 146 The difference, according to these cases, lies
in the lesser burden on a state's autonomy in the latter case, since the state
retains the formal power to refuse to do what the federal government
wants. 1
47
The distinction these cases draw between requiring a state to do
something and providing the state with an inducement to do it tracks the
difference between traditional top-down regulation and bargaining
145 The Supreme Court underlined the strength of these concerns in Solid Waste Agency v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In that case, a 5-4 majority used a distinctly
tendentious statutory analysis to conclude that Congress denied the Army Corps of Engineers authority
to regulate the dredging or filling of wetlands not connected to traditionally navigable waters, rather
than confront what it saw as the "significant constitutional and federalism questions" that would be
raised by such a "significant impingement of the States' traditional and primary power over land and
water use." Id. at 174; see also Karkkainen, supra note 95, at 7 ("Because the externalized effects of
land-use decisions were once thought to be principally, if not exclusively, local in nature, federal
intrusion into land use matters was generally regarded as unwise and contrary to the spirit of our
federalist structure, if not flatly proscribed by the Constitution.").
146 "Cooperative federalism" and conditional federal grants have been upheld in a series of
Supreme Court opinions, all of which stress the importance of the formal power to refuse. See, e.g.,
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (stating that Oklahoma retains "the simple expedient of
not yielding to what she urges is federal coercion"); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480
(1923) ("[T]he powers of the State are not invaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply
extends an option which the State is free to accept or reject."); cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
211 (1987). In Dole, the Court added that this power was not unlimited, since "[iun some
circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which 'pressure turns into compulsion."' Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
Such conditional spending and cooperative federalism approaches fit seamlessly into an
entitlements trading analysis, in that they increase the freedom of action of both federal and state
governments by changing the means used to pursue an end. Those approaches greatly expand the real
power of the federal government to act by allowing it to make use of a state's implementing
mechanisms rather than undertake the economically and politically difficult task of creating a purely
federal approach. Yet at the same time, these approaches are almost certain to be far less demoralizing
to the state than direct commands. Indeed, if they were not less demoralizing, they would almost by
definition be as hard to impose as rules providing for direct federal implementation. For an analysis
concluding that state implementation is preferable to federal because it is less demoralizing and
suggesting that states do decline to implement truly unpopular federal programs if given the choice, see
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes
Sense and 'Dual Sovereignty'Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998).
147 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 168 (1992).
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entitlements.
2. Takings
Under the Supreme Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, only
those rules that either cause a physical invasion of property or deprive a
property of virtually all commercial value automatically constitute a
compensable taking. 48 Conversely, measures to control harms like
pollution that originate on the property and affect others will probably
never constitute a compensable taking.1
49
Other cases, however, involve regulation of land to maintain its
ability to provide such environmental services as absorbing pollution
caused by other lands,150 or providing wildlife habitat, without destroying
all commercial value. Such cases fall in a middle area in which the
presence of a taking must be determined by an individualized factual
inquiry that addresses both the importance of the public interest being
served and the extent of the burden on the plaintiff. That burden, in turn, is
measured by damage to the plaintiffs investment-backed expectations as
determined by a detailed examination of the circumstances, including the
regulations applicable at the time the property was acquired.'15 Moreover,
148 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
149 See Heller & Krier, supra note 129, at 1010 (stating that the idea that "diminution in
property value caused by nuisance control measures" requires no compensation is a "per se rule in the
law of takings," at least for common law nuisances). Pollution is a classic common law nuisance.
Indeed, Professor Richard Epstein, the country's leading property rights advocate, believes both that
most government regulation should require compensation under the takings clause and that regulation
to control the physical invasion of one property by pollution from another never requires
compensation. See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 229 ("[The original common law rules specified the
correct normative result.... [Under them,] every invasion, however minute, of the protected space is
an actionable wrong remediable both by damages and injunction."). Epstein would apply this principle
to invasions other than conventional pollution. See id. at 50-51 (stating that invasion includes noise,
vibration, and smoke from aircraft operations); see also id. at 119-21.
Epstein also recognizes a similar absolute right against damage to resources with shared
common law usage rights. He discusses in detail and endorses the nineteenth century cases holding that
a change in the natural flow of a stream constitutes a trespass on the rights of downstream property
owners. See, e.g., id. at 70 (advocating "[u]sing the natural conditions of the water as the basis of
entitlement," so that "no individual may change the flow in ways that prevent others from using or
gaining access to the waters in question"); id. at 71 (private actions that change the height of natural
stream flow are "actionable wrongs remediable with damages and injunctions" at common law).
150 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392-94 (1994), in which the Court accepted
the legitimacy of requiring the plaintiff to dedicate enough of her property for flood control to offset
the extra flooding impact of the new impervious surface she planned to create but suggested that any
requirement to dedicate more property would be a compensable taking. Dolan involved the
adjudicative imposition of conditions on a single parcel. The Court also found that this required more
record support than would have been required for the legislative imposition of similar conditions on
many parcels through zoning. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385.
151 See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322
(2002) ("Our regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is characterized by 'essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries' ... designed to allow 'careful examination and weighing of all the relevant circumstances."'
(citations omitted)). That ad hoc factual inquiry involves the application of equally ad hoc legal
Vol. 21:1, 2004
Bargaining for Land Use Control
under the governing Supreme Court precedents, a landowner cannot even
bring a takings claim without first complying with all state land use
planning requirements-including any variance procedures-so as to
determine the exact property restrictions that will apply. 52 These
procedural requirements alone will defeat many takings claims.
Transmuting regulatory commands into bargaining entitlements would
allow landowners to bargain with the government over alternative
performance rather than be bound by the government's initial command.
That burden reduction should itself improve the constitutional defensibility
of the program at issue.
E. Re-established Property Rights
Entitlement bargaining would also vindicate constitutional values by
providing a mechanism to re-establish, over time, the property rights on
which environmental land use control measures are said to intrude.
Section 404 and the ESA impose inchoate responsibilities on all
affected land and add the federal government to the authorities already
involved in land use planning. Both steps diffuse the responsibility for
deciding what use to make of regulated land and tend to create an anti-
commons that diminishes the social advantages we expect from private
property.153 Yet environmental values do not receive stable protection,
since they are protected only to the extent that the anti-commons hampers
other uses.
Bargaining entitlements would allow both parties to move toward a
regime that dedicated some of the burdened property more fully to
environmental protection and removed restrictions from the rest. Under
our current regulatory approach, new objections to development of a
wetland or endangered species habitat can be raised at any time until the
property is actually developed. By contrast, such claims can only be made
once for land covered by restrictions that extinguish a bargaining
entitlement, since once the bargain is approved the government's right to
standards. The law is unclear on the extent of the diminution in property value that constitutes a taking,
on what types of regulation are most and least likely to trigger takings requirements, and on when
procedural delays in granting development permission do or do not trigger compensation requirements.
Although in 2002 the Supreme Court clarified another perpetually disputed issue, holding 5-4 that the
percentage diminution in value on which a takings claim is based must be calculated with reference to
the parcel as a whole, not simply the portion affected by the rule, the narrowness of the margin
suggests that this resolution may not be permanent. See id. at 327, 332, 355-56 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); see also Heller & Krier, supra note 130, at 1023-24. Note also the additional colorful
summaries of inconsistencies in "takings" law collected by Heller in Boundaries of Private Property,
supra note 66, at 1202 n.185.
152 For the factors used to determine ripeness for judicial review, see R. Shawn Gunnarson,
Just Compensation and the Endangered Species Act, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY
AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 74, at 459, 465.
153 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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raise repeated new objections vanishes.' 54 Widespread entitlement trading,
by extinguishing the underlying obligation wholesale, would probably lead
to widespread regulatory acknowledgment of the freedom of landowner
choice that wetlands and endangered species regulations are said to have
abridged. A landowner who banks wetlands to pay for developing other
properties, or devises an acceptable HCP, frees his ownership rights in his
remaining land from inchoate wetlands and ESA obligations in return for a
specific and defined donation. The result is a case-by-case repeal of the
land-use aspects of Section 404 and the ESA, not by political action, but
by a market exchange that frees some parcels of regulatory burdens in
return for subjecting others to more protection than the statute alone could
provide.
The scaling up process described earlier would make this natural
tendency even more effective. It would logically end in a regional land use
plan under which regulatory obligations under the wetlands and
endangered species statutes would cease to apply in return for the
establishment of a set of permanently protected areas. Any future attempt
to expand those areas would trigger compensation rights. In other words,
the repeal of the wetlands and endangered species statutes by market
exchange would enlarge from a case-by-case to a regional level.
VII. Potential Dangers of Bargaining Entitlement Programs
Despite their promise, bargaining entitlement programs could hamper
achievement of the very statutory purposes they are meant to promote and
increase the burdens on the regulated entities that they are meant to
relieve. These dangers are probably limited and could be reduced further
by effective program design.
A. Potential Damage to Statutory Purposes
1. Would the Agency Be Out-Bargained?
Agencies that implement traditional regulatory statutes specialize in
issuing and enforcing legally binding commands. An agency's authority to
impose its will often provides the background for any bargaining. Use of
154 According to one review of HCPs:
[T]he landowners who received "No Surprises" assurances maintain, and some
academic commentators agree, that their deals with the government are designed
to prevent them from being taken advantage of by committing land to
preservation that they might otherwise have developed and then, having made
such costly concessions, being forced by "greedy" activist regulators to give up
more (and later still more).
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bargaining entitlements would present agencies with a new challenge of
negotiating for results they had no power to command directly. A number
of studies have underlined how often agencies playing this game settle for
less than they should have.'55
In assessing those failures we should distinguish between technical
errors-failure to insist on data or approval conditions that allow
meaningful assessment of the value of the trade-and negotiating errors-
failure to drive a tight bargain within an acceptable evaluation framework.
Technical errors appear common in entitlement trades to date. Since
accurate assessment of the environmental values of a given parcel will
often be difficult and costly, developers have incentives to suggest
oversimplified ways of quantifying these values that make trades easy, for
example, by reducing the data and analytical support required for trades or
omitting monitoring to determine their success.156 Many of the problems
identified with trades stem from agency acquiescence to such
155 A National Academy of Sciences study found the following defects in agreements with
the Army Corps of Engineers to create new wetlands to compensate for those destroyed by
development:
The attainment of no net loss of wetlands through . .. mitigation requires
that performance requirements for individual compensation sites be clearly stated
and that the stated requirements will be met by the parties responsible for the
mitigation.... [I]n many cases, even though permit conditions may have been
satisfied, required compensation actions were poorly designed or carelessly
implemented....
At some sites, compliance criteria were being met, but the hydrological
variability that is a defining feature of a wetland had not been established....
Compliance criteria sometimes specified plant species that the site conditions
could not support . . . . Monitoring is seldom required for more than 5 years, and
the description of ecosystem functioning in many monitoring reports is
superficial. Legal and financial mechanisms for assuring long-term protection of
sites are often absent.
COMPENSATING FOR WETLANDS LOSS, supra note 37, at 6. Similarly, in a detailed study of forty-three
HCPs, the American Institute of Biological Sciences found that:
For only 22 of the 43 plans was there a clearly outlined monitoring program. Of
those 22 well-designed monitoring programs, only 7 took the next step of
indicating how the monitoring could be used to evaluate the HCP's success.
. .. [I]n only one-third of the species assessments was there enough information
to evaluate what proportion of the population would be affected by a proposed
"take." If we do not know whether one-half or one-hundredth of a species' total
population is being affected by an action, it is hard to make scientifically justified
decisions.
USING SCIENCE, supra note 36, at 4. The National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis found
that many HCP weaknesses were due to a basic lack of data. Although the absence of data can be
compensated for to some extent by a precautionary approach to HCP design that errs on the side of
protection, the survey found that such an approach was, if anything, less likely to be pursued where
data were inadequate than where they were adequate. See id. at 41.
156 [T]he cost of creating habitat currencies is either very cheap-an acre is an
acre-or, if we demand reliable measures of environmental and social service
values, very expensive .... Developers have an incentive to use the least
expensive currency the government will allow. . . . [T]he net result has been
Gresham's law in practice-simple currencies have driven out complex ones.
Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 85, at 59.
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oversimplification. Since neither the minimum analytical requirements for
a valid trade nor the minimum content requirements for a valid permit
should vary much from trade to trade, minimum standards for acceptable
trading decisions and permits could be established by rule and removed
from the bargaining context.' 
57
Once technical errors had been addressed, several factors should limit
the extent of negotiating errors. Any negotiation automatically
disadvantages the party that wants to change the status quo, since the other
party can stop that change by simply not responding. Since entitlement
bargains are designed to start with offers from the regulated entity, the
burden of inaction will generally fall on that entity. Moreover, the
government will often be a single decision-maker dealing with many
petitioning parties. That could create a prisoner's dilemma in which each
non-government party would be motivated to reach an advantageous deal
with the government on its own, rather than coordinate its opposition with
all the other parties.
58
Requirements borrowed from traditional rulemaking procedures could
provide additional assurance against bad bargains. These include
requirements to present proposed trades to the public for comment or to
157 The National Research Council has recommended this approach to correcting the
problems it identified with wetlands restoration agreements. It recommended replacing "[diependence
on subjective, best professional judgment in assessing wetlands function" with "science-based, rapid
assessment procedures" based on a new and detailed manual providing guidance to staff on how to
make such assessments, COMPENSATING FOR WETLANDS LOSS, supra note 37, at 7-8, and providing
detailed standards for all permits to meet, id. at 167. Many of the defects the Council identified, such
as use of inappropriate vegetation types or failure to require minimally adequate monitoring would
seem remediable by such reforms.
Similarly, the National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis recommends that all HCPs
with "potentially large impacts" include a summary of all the available data on covered species and
adopt a more quantitative approach to setting goals and measuring their achievement. See USING
SCIENCE, supra note 36, at 47. These requirements, too, could be readily established by regulation to
guide HCP establishment.
158 As a single unified entity, the state may be able to make offers to widely
dispersed individuals who find themselves faced with a prisoner's dilemma game.
Each person acting alone may think it is in his interest to waive some
constitutional right, even though a group, if it could act collectively, would reach
the opposite conclusion.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 79 (1993).
This is clearest in the case of safe harbor agreements. A landowner who improves her land and
attracts more species under a safe harbor agreement will probably also attract those animals to
neighboring lands. That in turn will increase the ESA burden on neighboring landowners. This will, as
the safe harbor policy itself suggests, increase the pressure on neighboring landowners to reach such
agreements on their own. 64 Fed. Reg. 32,717, 32,725-26 (June 17, 1999). Similarly, a landowner who
reaches a no surprises or candidate conservation agreement that proves inadequate to conserve the
species at issue can in effect transfer to other landowners the extra burden of the tighter conservation
measures now shown necessary. See Habitat Conservation Plan ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg.
8859, 8867 (Feb. 23, 1998) (stating that if additional conservation measures are needed for a species
covered by a "no surprises" HCP, those measures "would be the responsibility of the Federal
government, other government agencies, or other non-Federal landowners who had not yet developed
an HCP" (emphasis added)).
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allow outside expert bodies to review them either prospectively or
retrospectively.' 59 Public involvement combined with the symbolic
command in the background would encourage tight bargaining by
reminding an agency of the political force behind the statutes which give
the agency legitimacy.' 
60
Finally, even trades that accept less than the other side would have
offered need--not be bad public policy. If the original commands are
fundamentally off target, a second-rate trade could be superior to first-rate
enforcement of the statute as written. A trade of discharge controls on a
factory for controls on non-point discharges from land use might be
environmentally and socially beneficial even if the factory would have
offered far more to close the deal than the government actually extracted in
the bargain. Whenever private land use control is necessary to achieve
federal environmental goals, the gap between what our current statutes
promise and what they can provide will create opportunities for such
beneficial uhdertprformance. 161
Such considerations might not fully allay concerns about an agency's
ability to bargain effectively. But since almost all other institutions in our
society operate by bargaining,' 62 there seems to be no inherent reason why
agencies could not learn to operate in this manner. Rather, the relevant
question would be how to increase the government's bargaining ability,
should the potential gains from bargaining be large enough to justify that
effort. This Article contends that the gains from bargaining could be
substantial and would justify a significant reform effort.
163
2. Would Trading Be Legitimate?
Trading would grant the agency discretion to determine when and
how legislative directives should be modified in return for an alternative
159 The National Center for Ecological Analysis and Synthesis has recommended the
establishment of such an expert body for HCPs. See USING SCIENCE, supra note 36, at 47.
160 See Dwyer, supra note 78, at 236, 283-84, 287-88; Louis L. Jaffe, The Illusion of the
IdealAdministration, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1183, 1188 (1973).
161 One more potential pitfall deserves mention. It will often cost the government more to
negotiate individual entitlements trades than to enforce the underlying regulatory obligation. If the
government had a duty to address every trading offer on the merits, regulated parties could make a
trading offer simply to hamper enforcement. However, if the government had the right to refuse to
negotiate, as it does when it brings a lawsuit, this danger would not arise.
162 Indeed, local land use decisions are so strongly characterized by bargaining as to have
defeated many attempts to require them to be made through formal legal procedures. See generally
Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71
CAL. L. REV. 837, 867-82 (1983) (arguing that when federal interests are at stake, the mechanism to
achieve them should accept and work with these deeply rooted practices rather than trying to override
them).
163 For a preliminary discussion of some of these possible changes, see also Pedersen, supra
note 22, at 1072, 1076 n.14, 1103.
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that it concluded would more fully achieve the statutory purpose. Such
trading can be attacked as requiring basic value judgments by the agency
that lie beyond its competence. Such claims apply only weakly to a statute
like the Clean Water Act, where Congress has clearly defined water
quality goals but has authorized inadequate means to achieve them.61 No
inconsistency with the original congressional value judgment would result
from allowing the implementing agency to substitute for these inadequate
means others that would attain the end more effectively.
The objection has more force when applied to a statute like the ESA
that provides formally adequate means of achieving its goals, though they
cannot be implemented in the real world. An agency that trades the
symbolic promise of full species protection for more limited and concrete
restrictions on particular land invites opposition from supporters of the
symbolic command. These supporters might argue that such a categorical
goal, once established by the legislature, should not be revised by any
subordinate entity.'
65
However, the power to engage in trades would itself be conferred by
the legislature. A legislature that assigned to an agency the power to
clarify the symbolic over-promising that legislatures themselves find so
difficult to correct would act just as legitimately as a legislature that
established such excessive obligations in the first place. Moreover,
unachievable symbolic commands can undermine both integrity in
government and the actual achievement of their asserted goal.'
66
Accordingly, concrete, partial attainment of such commands may do more
to "redirect society by reallocating resources and legitimating certain
164 See supra text accompanying notes 44-52.
165 See Pedersen, supra note 22, at 1131-33. According to Professor Thompson:
In the eyes of proponents, legislative prescriptions of "symbolic" standards that
are presently unachievable serve a number of valuable functions, including the
stimulation of new, cost-effective means of achieving higher environmental
results, the making of important moral statements about the relationship of man to
his natural environment, and the societal development of heightened
environmental preferences and norms.
Thompson, supra note 77, at 1154-55 (footnotes omitted).
166 Symbolic legislation hinders rational discussion of the issues at stake, as Professor Dwyer
has argued:
Symbolic legislation hobbles the regulatory process by polarizing public
discussion in agency proceedings and legislative hearings. Environmental groups
take the legislation's promise of a risk-free environment at face value and tend to
refuse to compromise the "rights" inherent in such promises. Industry fears that
regulators will implement the statute literally and, consequently, vigorously
opposes the regulatory process at every stage. By making promises that cannot be
kept, and by leaving no middle ground for accommodation, the legislature makes
it more difficult to reach a political compromise (either in the agency or the
legislature) that would produce a functional regulatory program.
Dwyer, supra note 78, at 234. Symbolic legislation also creates great pressure on the agency to
accommodate sub rosa the factors that the legislature failed to address. See id. at 252-57. And then
"[w]hen decisionmaking is driven underground, rationality and genuine public participation are
sacrificed and public confidence in government is eroded." 1d. at 277.
Vol. 21:1, 2004
Bargaining for Land Use Control
values"'167 than the diligent preservation of symbols restricted to a statute
book.
Statutory beneficiaries might also claim that departures from the strict
and literal statutory language could be legitimate only if all interested
parties participated equally in the negotiations and reached a consensus
supporting the change. 168 That approach would give all participating
parties a bargaining entitlement of equal strength, since each of them could
derail the consensus.
However, past efforts at federal land use control have been blocked or
stunted at least in part by regulation's inability to minimize the
demoralization costs resulting from its invasion of deeply rooted social
interests such as landowner control and local autonomy. Entitlement
bargaining would help minimize such costs precisely because it gives
greater voice to the regulated entity. In other words, granting a preferential
voice may be appropriate to reflect the particular strength of the interests
to which it was granted-a strength that could prevent any action at all if
not accommodated.
B. Potential Exploitation of Regulated Parties
Making regulatory obligations tradable could decrease the immediate
costs of regulation by allowing regulated parties a wider range of
compliance choices. Over time, though, allowing trades could encourage a
regulatory agency to tighten those obligations, not to achieve the statutory
purposes directly but to encourage offers of alternative performance that
the government would be unable to command. In this manner, trading
could become a vehicle for extending federal power into regions that it
could not have reached previously, albeit by less demoralizing methods
than those of traditional regulation. 169 For example, the federal government
might avoid takings requirements by imposing tight water pollution
control measures on factories to induce them to establish pollution-
reducing buffer zones along streams, thus providing public land services
that the federal government might otherwise have been required to
purchase. 1
70
167 Dwyer, supra note 78, at 249.
168 Although public participation in agency decisions serves as quality control against
mistakes as well as a legitimating factor, quality control participation almost never rises above the
notice and comment rights described earlier. Accordingly, any consensus requirement would have to
rest on legitimacy arguments alone.
169 For a similar discussion of exploitation value, see Pedersen, supra note 22, at 1109-10,
1132-34.
170 Indeed, the ability to trade might encourage this pattern of action even when federalism
or serious takings concerns are not present. The courts generally review pollution controls on industry
more leniently than land use controls. The ability to trade industrial point source controls for land use
controls paid for by those point sources could therefore perversely encourage the establishment of
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This concern should not arise to the extent that the relatively non-
discretionary application of previously established requirements provides
the bargaining entitlement. Since such requirements would have been
adopted before trades were allowed, the chance to trade would not have
motivated their adoption. Since the legitimacy of most such requirements
has been established beyond serious question, the serious question
becomes how to implement them effectively and at low cost. Allowing
trades clearly moves in this direction, since parties to a successful trade
must all regard it as an improvement on the current system, while failed
negotiations simply leave the current system unaltered.
More troubling questions arise from trading regulatory obligations
that are established or become binding after the date on which the
bargaining program was established. For that reason, trading may be
particularly suited to reforming "mature" regulatory programs whose basic
implementing regulations have long since been established. Federal
regulations that address land use, like other types of land use regulations,
tend to be poorly defined until they are applied in a particular case.
17 1
Accordingly, the two main types of controls in this category will be new
regulations, issued after the bargaining date, that do not affect land use
directly, but which can be used to trade for it, and general land use control
regulations that are given concrete application after that date in the hope of
eliciting a counter-offer.
1. Controlling Exploitation Through New Rules
The temptation to set exploitative rules that do not affect land use
could be reduced by requirements that each individual rule cost-effectively
serve some environmental end. For example, a new discharge-control rule
might be required to produce enough water quality benefit to justify its
cost if applied directly as written, without regard to the benefits that its
trading value might produce. To establish such a requirement, Congress
could codify the requirement to apply a cost-benefit test to each new rule,
as required by Executive Order for the last thirty years, making such a test
part of the required substantive support for regulatory decisions. 7 2 Rules
tighter, more costly point source controls of limited environmental benefit that would be traded for
land use controls but which would not be subject to the strict judicial review that applies to land use
controls applied directly. Requiring all regulations that might be traded for land use controls to pass a
cost-benefit test would eliminate this arbitrage opportunity.
171 See EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 264 ("[M]ost systems of land use control are not normally
self-executing. Instead, they set out in very general terms the desired ends.... Thereafter the operation
of the system depends upon discrete applications.").
172 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974) (requiring certain
legislation, identified through a cost-effect analysis, to be subjected to an inflationary impact
evaluation); Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978) (requiring agencies to report the
economic consequences of proposed regulations and their alternatives); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46
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adopted purely for their exploitation value would, almost by definition,
lack the direct regulatory benefits necessary to pass through such a
screen. 173
By focusing attention on the larger purposes of the control effort, use
of bargaining entitlements would increasingly discourage efforts to adopt
new rules for their exploitation value. In the water pollution context, the
new trading approach would put more emphasis on water quality, broadly
defined, as the overall goal for all control efforts, since water quality
impact would be used to compare trades. 174 That emphasis would itself
undermine support for point source controls with large costs but small
water quality benefits. As both regulators and regulated entities gained
experience with the process, the drawbacks of simply tightening controls
on easy-to-regulate point sources, without addressing land use, would
become increasingly apparent, further discouraging the adoption of
unjustified point source controls.
2. Controlling Exploitation by Federal Land Use Controls
Whenever the federal government accepts banked wetlands in
satisfaction of a Section 404 permit obligation or approves a habitat
conservation plan containing long-term land use restrictions, it converts a
regulatory obligation into a property interest dedicated to undeveloped use
as a nature preserve. That dedication is a paradigm case of a "using" that
would likely trigger compensation requirements if the government
required it through a direct legal command. 75 One might well argue that a
policy that grants relief from regulatory obligations in return for a donation
of property interests tacitly admits that acquisition of property interests
was always the real motive. In that view, the regulation would be an
attempt to evade takings obligations, analogous to a forbidden downzoning
of property that a government wants to acquire. 176 The use of bargaining
Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981) (requiring that "[r]egulatory action shall not be undertaken unless the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society"); Exec. Order
No. 12,866, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (1993) (requiring agencies to "assess all costs and benefits of
available regulatory alternatives, including the alternative of not regulating"). President George W.
Bush has continued the Clinton order.
173 Bargaining and trading would still take place, however, whenever a regulated entity could
offer trades that achieved social benefits even more efficiently than the baseline regulation that passed
these tests.
174 The Clean Water Act goals of "fishable, swimmable" water supporting a "balanced
indigenous population" of wildlife qualifies as such a broad definition, since achieving it depends on
the flow characteristics of streams and the amount of water in them, not just on pollution levels. Clean
Water Act § 303.
175 See Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1114-15, 1157 (1993) (advocating
compensation whenever "some productive attribute or capacity of private property is exploited for
state-dictated service").
176 For discussion of downzoning, see Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 327 P.2d 10 (Cal.
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entitlements can be viewed in this perspective as increasing the original
damage to property rights instead of reducing it. Although bargaining
entitlements reduce demoralization costs by giving the landowner a wider
range of compliance means, they may also allow the assertion of claims
that would have been unsustainable under a purely regulatory approach.
An agency that would not have dared to refuse permission to develop a
wetland or an endangered species habitat, for fear of triggering an adverse
political reaction or a successful takings challenge, might be bolder if the
target could satisfy the agency's claim with a modest donation of property
that would probably cost less than litigating the issue. Using bargaining
entitlements might therefore lead to a net increase in the amount of land
dedicated to federally prescribed environmental uses without the payment
of compensation.' 77
Exploitation dangers cannot be reduced in this context, as they could
for water pollution control, by requiring all regulations to pass a cost-
benefit test before they can be traded. Obtaining the free use of land can be
highly beneficial. The issue instead is the uncompensated intrusion on
landowner and community autonomy. Yet, the ability to threaten that
intrusion is the foundation for the government's bargaining entitlement.
However, the argument that trading entitlements for land use control
improperly avoids paying compensation loses much of its force once we
view the tradable entitlements not as clearly valid substantive claims but as
the procedural rights to assert regulatory claims and to defend against
them. An agency that drops such procedural claims in return for
substantive relief acts no differently than an agency that settles a lawsuit.
Settling a lawsuit is a type of entitlement bargaining in which the plaintiff
trades her entitlement to pursue the lawsuit, and the chance of ultimate
victory, for some agreed-upon relief. Use of settlements has been
challenged on the ground that:
Settlements are especially likely to reflect the inequalities of power and
resources that the parties bring to the bargaining table; they may well
affect parties who were not and could not have been part of the
Dist. Ct. App. 1958); City of Miami v. Silver, 257 So.2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Grand Trunk
W. Ry. v. City of Detroit, 40 N.W.2d 195 (Mich. 1949); Riggs v. Long Beach Township, 538 A.2d
808, 815 (N.J. 1988).
177 The literature on HCPs regularly refers to the coercive elements of habitat conservation
planning. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 95, at 60 ("Clearly, the ESA's ban on adverse habitat
modification gives the government a powerful club to hold over the heads of would-be developers and
local officials, in order to induce their participation in 'voluntary' biodiversity conservation planning
efforts."); Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 85, at 678 ("To a great extent, [habitat conservation plans]
serve as political steam valves, dissipating public attacks and blunting pointed legislation and
litigation." (citations omitted)); see also id. at 677 n.206 ("[The authority of the Fish and Wildlife
Service] to prohibit development of habitat under the ESA is far from certain in most circumstances,
but the agency has used that uncertainty to lead many developers to seek HCP permits in lieu of testing
the bounds of the [Fish and Wildlife Service] power in court.").
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negotiation; they may leave the courts without an adequate foundation
for subsequent interventions; and, finally, they provide no authoritative
declaration of rights.1
78
Such objections closely mirror those leveled against agencies using
bargaining entitlements, which are said to favor regulated entities that
possess more bargaining resources than the government, affect the
interests of unrepresented third party beneficiaries of the regulatory
program, and dilute the statements of legal principle embodied in the
statute. 179 Despite these objections, settlement of lawsuits remains all but
universally accepted. The applicable federal court rules strongly endorse
settlement without regard to the nature of the controversy,180 and the vast
majority of cases filed settle.'
8'
Moreover, several of the objections to settlements apply with much
less force to entitlement bargains. The claim that compromise prevents
clarification of the law seems ironic when applied to bargaining over
issues of permissible land use control that have remained opaque through
many years of controversy. Similarly, the claim that settlement undermines
judicial power by reducing the judge's role to a formality does not apply to
entitlement trades accepted by the same agency charged with enforcing the
underlying statute. Procedures for entitlement trading could easily give
third parties the same notice and comment rights that they would have
enjoyed if the agency had regulated directly. Finally, a developed
settlement procedure should not increase the substantive legal advantages
of either side. 8 2 Since any party can refuse to settle and return to the
original procedures, settlement should reflect the outcome the parties
expect those original procedures to produce.'
83
It might be rational for the government to bring or threaten a
regulatory enforcement action for exploitation purposes despite the
existence of strong legal defenses if the expected costs of settling by
compromise would be less than the expected cost of a successful
178 Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1,2.
179 See generally Dana & Koniak, supra note 154, at 473.
180 See FED. R. EviD. 408; FED. R. CIr. P. 16(c). Defenders of this approach argue that
settling reflects the basic operating rules of a legal system built on free choice. Settlement by definition
leaves the parties better off and saves the social resources that litigation would consume. To the
(debated) extent that litigation may have value to society, that is no reason to compel the parties to the
litigation to pay for it. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 19.
181 See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497, 498 (1991); Marc Galantner & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle":
Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994).
182 This assumes that the government cannot be drawn into settlement negotiations against
its will. See supra note 161.
183 See Easterbrook, supra note 180, at 28-29.
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defense.'8 4 The expected cost of a successful defense, in turn, would be
determined by (1) the costs of making that defense adjusted for the
chances of winning and (2) the costs of losing adjusted for the chances of
losing. The government could be discouraged from bringing weak cases
for their exploitation value by adjusting these factors.
The most obvious adjustments would reduce the costs of litigating
takings claims. These could take the form either of procedural reforms to
reduce litigation costs or of fee-shifting provisions to allow those who
successfully challenged regulatory burdens to recover their litigation costs
from the government. 
1 85
Finally, these detailed legal points overlook the two strongest
arguments for entitlement bargaining even in the fundamentally disputed
area of takings law: First, entitlement bargaining can be expected to re-
establish property rights more successfully than any other approach; and
second, the process of entitlement bargaining itself would tend to restrain
the assertion of weak regulatory claims for their negotiation value.
The scaled-up negotiation of a trading plan would in itself reduce the
government's ability to escalate demands for negotiating purposes. A
negotiation with broad participation would be more public and transparent
than a regulatory claim against an individual landowner and would bring
in a wider variety of political forces on the side of the regulated party. In
particular, it would highlight any inconsistency between federal claims and
state and local land use plans. That would increase the ability of the
regulated entity to recognize and resist excessive demands.
VIII. Future Development of the Bargaining Entitlement Approach
I have described how bargaining entitlements have worked in
practice, outlined their advantages, and suggested how to overcome their
weaknesses. I now suggest how to expand their future use, both within
their current field of employment and in new areas.
A. Broader Use of Bargaining Entitlements in Their Current Context
Entitlement bargaining can integrate a wide range of regulatory
benefits and obligations, affecting a large number of actors, into a single,
defined set of land use controls. The opportunities for mutually beneficial
trades will increase as the coverage of regulatory commands, affected
184 Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD.
437 (1988).
185 The Equal Access to Justice Act already provides for such fee-shifting in certain agency
proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 504 (2002). Even after fee-shifting rules were fully implemented, both the
remaining procedural burdens and the chances of losing on the merits would continue to provide
settlement incentives for both sides.
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persons, and land areas increases, provided that such broader scope does
not make bargaining too cumbersome. For that express reason, the Interior
Department has identified the future of HCPs-probably the most
developed form of entitlement bargaining-as the integration of all the
ESA's requirements over broad areas.
The Clean Water Act would be particularly well-adapted to a
similarly broad approach. Despite the statute's declared intent to clean up
the nation's waters, it may be impossible even in principle for the federal
government to define for a state a minimum level of water quality related
social benefits that would have regulatory meaning. The EPA simply has
no legitimate or workable way to balance, for a given state, the benefits of
land use controls against the autonomy interests of local governments and
the rights and preferences of local property owners. This balance would
have to consider not just the social benefits of clean surface water, but also
any associated benefits in such forms as cleaner ground water, increased
flood protection, preservation of wetlands, preservation of natural flow
regimes and the biodiversity that depends on them, wildlife protection, and
the protection of natural beauty. The EPA has even less power to
determine whether any one watershed should be preserved in a more
pristine form than another.
Entitlement bargaining could resolve this dilemma by allowing states
themselves to make these trading choices, using the currently-available set
of federally mandated controls as a starting point. These mandates affect
economic activity within states,186 restrict the autonomy of their citizens,
impose direct costs on state governments to the extent that states run the
programs, and forbid certain state policy choices. States might well be
willing to offer the EPA some other set of water pollution controls to
replace the currently authorized programs in return for a reduction in these
existing burdens. A state might be willing, for example, to loosen controls
on point source dischargers in industrial areas in return for a commitment
to limit development in certain rural areas to the extent necessary to keep
the streams in those areas unimpaired.
The EPA, for its part, should have no objection to such a trade if
equal or greater water quality benefits would result, and if the bargain
were enforceable. It should be easy to determine, in particular cases,
whether this generic standard of "equal or greater clean water benefits"
had been met. If necessary, the decision-making standards could be further
specified by statute. For example, an alternative program might be
required to provide an increase of X percent over compliance with the
186 According to the EPA, the annualized costs of Clean Water Act compliance in 1997 were
$5 billion for privately owned point sources and $9 billion for public point sources. OFFICE OF POL'Y,
ECON., AND INNOVATION, EPA, A RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE COSTS OF THE CLEAN WATER
ACT: 1972 TO 1997, at ES-5 (2000).
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prescribed approach in the percentage of state waters meeting water
quality standards, or supporting a "balanced, indigenous population" of
fish and wildlife.
187
Such trading rights would encourage the development of new control
approaches, reduce demoralization costs, and tend to substitute land use
controls with collateral public benefits for end-of-the-pipe controls with no
benefits beyond pollution reduction. Any land use controls imposed to
protect water quality would reflect local decisions, rather than a detailed
federal mandate, thus encouraging a variety of local approaches to a
common problem-one of the key virtues of federalism. These alternative
approaches might also raise takings issues that the original approach did
not raise if, for example, a state decided to concentrate its efforts on
keeping certain watersheds undeveloped while allowing development
elsewhere. But such takings issues would reflect state policy choices and
would not be imposed by the federal government. Accordingly, the
affected state would decide, through its own legal and political systems,
when compensation was worth paying.'
88
That decentralized approach would clarify the complex set of issues
involved in water pollution control more effectively than our current
symbolic mandates. Trading ineffective regulation of point-source
discharges for more beneficial controls on land use would both illustrate
and remedy the inability of regulation to produce the water quality benefits
that such regulation promises. Allowing states to choose the water bodies
in which pristine water quality would be protected would further illustrate
the inability of the Clean Water Act-or any control approach-to produce
pristine water everywhere and thus bring a dose of realism to the policy
debate.
There is no need to stop with the Clean Water Act. By similar logic,
states, or geographical areas within states, could integrate all the
commands of the Clean Water Act, Section 404, and the ESA into a single
187 See Pedersen, supra note 43, at 99-100, for a similar suggestion.
188 In fact, fixing the right to decide the permissible bounds of property regulation firmly at
the state level might favor redefining property rights in a "green" direction for structural reasons.
Takings claims tend to fail to the extent that the regulation at issue can be viewed as spreading burdens
and benefits evenly throughout the community, thus producing such an "average reciprocity of
advantage" as to make efforts at more precise compensation not worth the effort. Pa. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.). A decision by a smaller community that the costs of
relatively uniform land restrictions within its boundaries are justified by the community benefits will
be inherently more likely to be justified by average reciprocity of advantage than imposition of the
same burdens on the same community by a larger polity, including voters who will not share the cost
of meeting it.
In addition, as noted earlier, see supra note 100, the right to compensation is often triggered by
regulatory burdens that exceed community standards for uncompensated regulation. Since it is easier to
change standards in a small community than in a large one, or at least easier to see that the change has
taken place, this line of analysis also indicates that if takings rules are to be changed at all, the change
must take place at the state and local level.
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plan as long as equal or greater environmental benefits would result. That
would focus preservation efforts even more strongly on lands that provided
multiple environmental benefits, such as wetlands that also served as water
filters and endangered species habitat.
B. New Arenas for Bargaining Entitlements: The Example of Interstate
Water Pollution Control
Arguably, federal action is not needed to protect the inhabitants of a
state from pollution arising within its boundaries, since the state itself
already has full power to control it. States, however, have no such power
to control pollution that enters their territory from other states.
Before the states joined the federal union, they enjoyed a right of self-
protection against environmental pollution by their neighbors as sovereign
nations under public international law. After the federal union was formed,
the national government became the custodian of this right, which was
transformed into a right to bring suit under federal common law against
their neighbors for cross-boundary pollution.1 89 The Supreme Court has
held, however, that the 1972 Clean Water Act preempted the states' ability
to sue upstream states for legal relief against pollution. 90 The Act placed
the responsibility for regulating interstate pollution in the hands of the
EPA, and thereby repealed the states' common law authority to seek
abatement of upstream pollution. The Act left states with a vaguely stated
right to petition the EPA for action.' 91 Consequently, a state that had
189 The original right of self-help was replaced by the remedy of relief through original
litigation in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907)
(Holmes, J.); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901). Before 1972, the Supreme Court
repeatedly exercised its jurisdiction to hear water pollution cases of this nature. See, e.g., New York v.
New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921).
Pollution that flows from one state to another is also a thing in interstate commerce, subject to
federal regulatory power even under the reasoning of Lopez and Morrison. The Supreme Court found
in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 953-54 (1982), that the "multistate character"
of the groundwater in the Ogallala aquifer "confirms the view that there is a significant federal interest
in conservation ... of this diminishing resource." Lower courts have applied this logic to hold that
"there is no doubt that surface waters, especially those that border on or traverse through more than
one state, are an integral part of interstate commerce." United States v. NL Indus., Inc., 936 F. Supp.
545, 558 (S.D. Il. 1996); cf Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (holding that the Clean
Water Act preempted Vermont's nuisance law as applied to a New York point source polluter). Both
lines of argument support a comprehensive federal power to control interstate pollution.
The logic of these arguments is not confined to pollution control. A state that takes more than
"its share" of migratory fish or birds, either by capture or by destroying their habitat, can properly be
restricted from thus violating what can be conceptualized either as an interest of other states or as a
national interest. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920); William Funk, The Court, the
Clean Water Act, and the Constitution: SWANCC and Beyond, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,741, 10,766
(2001).
190 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981).
191 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DuKE L.J. 931,
932 (1997) ("Notwithstanding the broad general trend toward centralized regulatory authority in
environmental law, and the widespread invocation of transboundary pollution as a justification for that
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established tight water quality standards and regulations to achieve them
might lack any effective remedy for violations caused by out-of-state
discharges.
192
Since extensive land use control would be required to prevent one
state from exporting water pollution to another, Congress' failure to
address this issue can be seen as an extension of its failure to address land
use in other contexts. 193 Here as elsewhere, direct federal control of private
land use would override too many locally-centered, rival interests to be
legitimate or feasible. An alternative approach could require a state or
local government to impose the controls. Although the federal government
might have the constitutional power to issue a legal command to one state
to stop polluting another state by a certain amount, 194 it might be more
practical to condition receipt of federal benefits on a state's taking such
action. 195
Both approaches would resemble bargaining entitlements by allowing
a state to select the means to achieve the statutory ends. A conditioned
trend, little meaningful regulation of transboundary pollution actually exists."). For more detailed
descriptions of water pollution specifically, see Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992); Merrill,
supra, at 956-57.
192 Requiring a state to regulate polluters within its boundaries tightly enough to achieve
environmental standards in another state could lead to abuses. Professor Revesz would control such
abuses by applying a standard drawn from dormant Commerce Clause cases, which allow state laws
that bear equally on in-state and out-of-state interests and strike down those that impose a special
burden on out-of-staters. Specifically, Revesz argues that states should be allowed to place the costs-
per-unit of avoided in-state environmental damage on out-of-staters in the same amount that it asks its
own citizens to bear. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2341, 2376-85 (1996). Merrill articulates a very similar principle, calling it, not inaptly,
the Golden Rule. Merrill, supra note 191, at 936, 1008-17.
The formally neutral "equal burdens in-state and out" standard, which seems analytically
compelling as a starting point, is not as simple as it looks. Without violating this principle, a state
could choose to regulate areas where the damage primarily came from out-of-state and leave relatively
unregulated any areas where the damage came from local sources. For example, a state at the mouth of
a river might adopt strong water pollution standards that would bear heavily on upriver jurisdictions,
while simultaneously adopting relatively lenient wetlands protection laws. As Professor Revesz points
out, in dormant Commerce Clause cases the courts have granted states great discretion in making
balancing judgments of this nature. See Revesz, supra, at 2408; see also Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery, Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (upholding a Minnesota ban on plastic milk containers even
though cardboard containers, the most likely substitute, were made from pulpwood, an important
Minnesota product).
193 The contrasting history of the interstate pollution provisions of the Clean Water Act and
the Clean Air Act provides some confirmation of the role of land use. While the interstate pollution
provisions of the Clean Water Act have been a virtual dead letter as discussed supra note 189, the
interstate pollution provisions of the Clean Air Act-which do not require the imposition of land use
controls to achieve their goals-have supported a lively program of regulation and litigation. See, e.g.,
Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding comprehensive EPA regulation of
interstate pollution); Air Pollution Control Dist. v. EPA, 739 F.2d 1071 (6th Cir. 1984).
194 According to one commentator, the Supreme Court found in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S.
208 (1901), that "Illinois, the source state, would be legally responsible if pollution emanating from its
territory was found to cause an actionable public nuisance in Missouri" and reaffirmed that finding in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Merrill, supra note 191, at 941 & n.37.
195 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Bargaining for Land Use Control
spending approach, enforced through limited burdens that give the state
some practical ability to decline compliance, would also resemble
entitlement bargaining. Although both approaches would substantially
reduce the defects of a top-down approach, neither would correct them
completely. Both approaches would require the federal government to
define in advance, by legislation or top-down regulation, such operating
parameters as the amount of interstate pollution to be allowed and the
consequences if the reduction were not achieved. That would present the
state with a binary and non-negotiable choice--either reduce pollution by
the contemplated amount, thus discharging the control burden, or fall short
of that burden and accept the specified consequences. To discharge such a
burden, the state would have to restrict the autonomy of affected
landowners by using its land use control powers in ways the state had not
itself chosen. The imposition of such a burden through a top-down
approach would therefore encounter many of the same obstacles to federal
land use regulation discussed earlier.
Those obstacles might be overcome in part by using bargaining
entitlements to help set regulatory goals and parameters. Under such an
approach, a state would qualify for entitlement relief when it had
developed a satisfactory plan to abate interstate pollution.
A similar approach has been used to reconcile the interests of
different levels of government linked together in an overall system of
divided authority. This approach grants one level of government the power
to make a decision and another an absolute or qualified power to veto it."'
The right to veto confers an entitlement on its holder that can be used to
bargain over the shape of the decision. That approach could be readily
adapted to the interstate pollution context by allowing, for example, the
196 See Clayton P. Gillette, The Exercise of Trumps by Decentralized Governments, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1347 (1997). Gillette locates the need for such a reconciling mechanism in the fact that "the
ideal boundaries for achieving any one governmental function will only by fortuity coincide with the
ideal boundaries for achieving any of the others," which suggests the formation of different
governments for different functions. Id. at 1349. Establishing a new government for each function with
a different boundary is clearly impossible. Equipping the "weaker" level of government with a veto
over the acts of the stronger (or requiring unanimous consent to certain acts) can protect the weaker
jurisdiction against encroachment, even with jurisdictional boundaries that might otherwise lead to
exploitation.
Such vetoes by both the state and federal governments over the actions of the other are an
established feature of environmental law. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act allows states to veto any
federal project that might interfere with the attainment of state water quality standards. Clean Water
Act § 401; see PUD No. 1 v. Washington. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). Conversely, both
the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act allow the EPA to veto state-issued permits. Clean Water
Act § 402(d)(2); Clean Air Act § 505(b). It is the thesis of this Article that in the field of land use
control, states are the "stronger" government, so that any veto or other entitlement should be held by
others and directed at the state's actions. Although both Gillette and the statutory precedents speak in
terms of vetoes, there is no logical reason why protection for the "weaker" government should take
only that form. Any right of one government to impose a burden on another can serve as a bargaining
entitlement.
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federal government (or a downstream state) to veto certain land use
decisions in an upstream state or to withhold certain federal moneys until a
satisfactory plan had been developed. Once this veto framework had been
established, it could provide a framework for multi-party bargaining,
debates, and deployment of additional types of entitlement as described
earlier.197
Conditions on federal spending might also be used to encourage states
to adopt land use restrictions for other purposes, including the preservation
of water quality, wetlands, and wildlife within their own boundaries.
Commentators concerned that more aggressive use of spending conditions
could undermine constitutional protections on state autonomy have
suggested that such conditions be permitted only if Congress could also
have used Commerce Clause regulation to pursue the same course of
action.198 Justice O'Connor has suggested in a similar vein that conditions
be restricted to expenditures related to the goal of the condition. 199 That is,
highway funds could be conditioned on enacting seatbelt laws, but not on
voting reform.
Spending conditions to achieve environmental protection could
readily pass both these tests. Courts, with few exceptions, have directly
upheld even command-and-control environmental regulatory programs
against constitutional challenge. And federal spending programs that affect
land use, like highway and dam construction subsidies, waterway dredging
programs, and agricultural price supports, exceed $60 billion a year.200
Requiring these funds to be spent in an environmentally protective manner
would involve no conceivable violation of principle. On the contrary, it
would broaden the benefits of the entitlements approach by converting
major federal spending programs as well as regulatory obligations into
incentives for comprehensive, locally motivated, and environmentally
protective land use plans.
197 Defining each state's initial entitlement rights against pollution from others would be an
inescapably federal function. This Article does not discuss who should hold the entitlements once they
have been established; that is, who should be allowed to enforce and trade them. Butler and Macey
argue that in simple two-party situations (such as an upstream state and a downstream state) there is no
reason not to make the downstream state the holder of the entitlement. See Butler & Macey, supra note
15, at 37-40, 53-54. More complicated situations arise where more than two states along a river are
both upstream and downstream to others or where various states contribute to the pollution of a
common resource like the Chesapeake Bay. Here, difficulties of multi-party bargaining may suggest
assigning the entitlement to the federal government or at least giving it a decision-making role along
with other entitlement holders.
198 See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911, 1916, 1954 (1995).
199 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212-18 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200 To pick one very crude measure, in 2001 the federal government spent $35.4 billion on
"ground transportation," $22.8 billion on "farm income stabilization," and $5.4 billion on "water
resources," totaling $63.6 billion. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 2002, at 307 tbl.453. This was four times the combined budgets of the EPA ($7.5 billion) and
the Interior Department ($8.2 billion). Id. at 106 thl.452.
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IX. Conclusion
The current structure of federal environmental law has proved unable
to address private land use coherently, despite the presence of a strong
environmental case for such controls and no clear lack of constitutional
power to impose them. This inadequacy stems largely from the rigid
categories of our regulatory system. Such categories assume, for example,
that the government alone must make regulatory decisions, so that shared
decisions made by contract are less legitimate. Similarly, objections to a
government decision are assumed to be either valid or invalid, and
incurring the process costs of deciding that issue is assumed to be better
than resolving it by compromise. Regulatory measures are assumed either
to attain the statutory ends or to fail them, so that it is better to strive for
complete achievement than to accept a more limited result and seek a
balance by other means. The day-to-day practice of our regulatory system
often deviates from this matrix, but its tacit acceptance as a model restricts
our ability to achieve public results in areas where the government lacks
power to achieve its ends by unilateral commands.
This Article has outlined an alternative approach under which the
government, like most other legal entities, would bargain for the results it
desired. To avoid simple-minded reliance on dialogue alone, the
government would be equipped with "entitlements"-the ability to burden
or benefit other parties to the discussion-to create a motive to agree on a
compromise. This approach could often avoid the political and legal
resistance that has gridlocked federal efforts to issue direct legal
commands in disputed areas. Over time, it could also change the
functioning of the government itself, removing the isolation from the rest
of society that our current regulatory approach helps to create and
engaging government agents more directly in dealings with the citizens
they serve.
In all three types of bargaining entitlements discussed, the original
regulatory obligation would become valued, not so much for its power to
require the originally contemplated performance, as for its trading value to
obtain land use controls. 20 1 Trading would diminish the symbolic nature of
the underlying statute by integrating it more closely with other social
201 The ESA's no surprises policy makes this explicit, stating that:
[M]uch of the habitat of listed species is in non-Federal lands.... Yet, while
thousands of acres of species habitat were disappearing each year, only a handful
of [habitat conservation plans] had been sought and approved [since they were
first authorized]. The No Surprises policy was designed to rechannel this
uncontrolled ongoing habitat loss . . . by offering regulatory certainty to non-
Federal landowners in exchange for a long-term commitment to species
conservation.
Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances ("No Surprises") Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8861 (Feb. 23,
1998).
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values and forces. The Clean Water Act's promise of clean water
nationwide, or the ESA's promise of universal endangered species
protection, would become more qualified-and more realistic-as they
were traded for other types of relief. Trading would also tend to transmute
regulatory burdens into traditional bounded property rights that specified
the use to be made of the land, burdened it for long periods (or in
perpetuity), and could not be changed without payment to the owner.2 °2
Entitlement bargaining could clarify for nature preservation advocates
the costs of our "baseline" statutory approach in terms of other values on
their agenda and could, conversely, focus the attention of the communities
involved on the benefits of preserving undeveloped land. The success that
bargaining efforts have already achieved suggests that efforts to bridge the
gap between parties' interests would be well rewarded.
202 The trading policies all expressly address these points. As noted above, see Section V.B,
wetlands banking requires protection of the banked lands under state property law. The safe harbor
policy requires that the conservation assurances that the landowner provides must "run with the
enrolled lands" but apparently do not bind a new landowner unless he consents. See 64 Fed. Reg.
32,717, 32,724 (June 17, 1999). The candidate conservation agreement policy similarly provides for
notice to any new landowner with an opportunity to reaffirm the agreement. 64 Fed. Reg. 32,726,
32,736 (June 17, 1999). These assurances only last for the lifetime of the agreement in question.
However, many habitat conservation plans have lifetimes of thirty to fifty years or even longer.
Donovan, supra note 120, at 334.
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